Physical Layer Security in Wireless Networks: Design and Enhancement. by Wang, Lifeng
Physical Layer Security in Wireless Networks: Design and Enhancement.
Wang, Lifeng
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/9019
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
Physical Layer Security in Wireless
Networks: Design and Enhancement
by
Lifeng Wang
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Electronic Engineering
Queen Mary University of London
United Kingdom
March 2015
Abstract
Security and privacy have become increasingly signicant concerns in wireless communi-
cation networks, due to the open nature of the wireless medium which makes the wireless
transmission vulnerable to eavesdropping and inimical attacking. The emergence and
development of decentralized and ad-hoc wireless networks pose great challenges to the
implementation of higher-layer key distribution and management in practice. Against
this background, physical layer security has emerged as an attractive approach for per-
forming secure transmission in a low complexity manner. This thesis concentrates on
physical layer security design and enhancement in wireless networks.
First, this thesis presents a new unifying framework to analyze the average secrecy
capacity and secrecy outage probability. Besides the exact average secrecy capacity
and secrecy outage probability, a new approach for analyzing the asymptotic behavior is
proposed to compute key performance parameters such as high signal-to-noise ratio slope,
power oset, secrecy diversity order, and secrecy array gain. Typical fading environments
such as two-wave with diuse power and Nakagami-m are taken into account.
Second, an analytical framework of using antenna selection schemes to achieve secrecy
is provided. In particular, transmit antenna selection and generalized selection combin-
ing are considered including its special cases of selection combining and maximal-ratio
combining.
Third, the fundamental questions surrounding the joint impact of power constraints on
the cognitive wiretap channel are addressed. Important design insights are revealed
regarding the interplay between two power constraints, namely the maximum transmit
at the secondary network and the peak interference power at the primary network.
Fourth, secure single carrier transmission is considered in the two-hop decode-and-
i
forward relay networks. A two-stage relay and destination selection is proposed to mini-
mize the eavesdropping and maximize the signal power of the link between the relay and
the destination. In two-hop amplify-and-forward untrusted relay networks, secrecy may
not be guaranteed even in the absence of external eavesdroppers. As such, cooperative
jamming with optimal power allocation is proposed to achieve non-zero secrecy rate.
Fifth and last, physical layer security in large-scale wireless sensor networks is introduced.
A stochastic geometry approach is adopted to model the positions of sensors, access
points, sinks, and eavesdroppers. Two scenarios are considered: i) the active sensors
transmit their sensing data to the access points, and ii) the active access points forward
the data to the sinks. Important insights are concluded.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless networks have experienced rapid evolutions towards scalability, interoperability,
and sustainability. Future networked societies will drive the digital economy to a more
holistic community of intelligent infrastructures and connected services for a smarter and
more sustainable society. Device-to-device (D2D) communication, dense networks, and
security are envisaged as core components of next generation heterogeneous 5G networks.
Traditional homogeneous cellular networks are moving towards heterogeneous for seam-
less transmission in multi-tiered networks with multiple classes of base stations. D2D
communication has been developed to support direct single- and multi-user transmis-
sions, in order to decrease delays and enhance spectrum eciency and energy eciency.
The secondary users are allowed to utilize the same frequency spectrum with the primary
users in cognitive radio, to improve the spectrum eciency. Multi-hop transmissions in
wireless sensor and ad-hoc networks expand the coverage. Future 5G network will serve
as a key enabler to meet the continuously increasing demand for future wireless appli-
cations, including ultra-high data rate, ultra-wide radio coverage, ultra-large number
of devices, and ultra-low latency [1, 2]. Given the ubiquitousness and necessity of 5G
connections in the near future, an enormous amount of sensitive and condential infor-
mation, e.g., nancial data, electronic media, medical records, and customer les, will
1
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be transmitted via wireless channels. However, the emergence of these new advanced
systems pose great challenges to the implementation of higher-layer key distribution
and management. Physical layer security is an appealing alternative to resist various
malicious abuses and security attacks. The basic concept behind it is to exploit charac-
teristics of wireless channels for transmitting condential messages. Its target is to blind
the eavesdroppers such that they cannot extract any condential information from the
received signals.
1.1 Research Motivation
Compared with cryptography, physical layer security techniques do not depend on com-
putational complexity, which implies that the achieved level of security will not be com-
promised even if the unauthorized smart devices in the network have powerful compu-
tational capabilities. This is in contrast to the computation-based cryptography which
is based upon the premise that the unauthorized devices have insucient computational
capabilities for hard mathematical problems. In the future network, devices are always
connected to the nodes with dierent powers and computation capabilities at the dif-
ferent levels of the hierarchical architecture. Also, devices always join in or leave the
network at random time instants, due to the decentralized nature of the network. As a
consequence, cryptographic key distribution and management become very challenging.
To cope with this, physical layer security can be used to either provide direct secure
data communication or facilitate the distribution of cryptographic keys. The potentials
of physical layer security in the multiple-antenna techniques and emerging systems need
to be exploited. Therefore, this thesis is motivated by the following aspects.
Antenna Selection: Amongst multiple-antenna techniques, the low-complexity
antenna selection schemes have been widely adopted and standardized in the IEEE
802.11n for WLAN [3], IEEE 802.16 for WiMAX [4], long term evolution (LTE) and
LTE-Advanced [5]. Physical layer security using transmit antenna selection has been
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investigated in the literature such as [6, 7]. However, a comprehensive study for general-
ized antenna selection system has not been provided, some key performance parameters
such as high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) slope and high SNR power oset have not been
evaluated in the existing works. Moreover, since physical layer security exploits the prop-
erties of wireless fading channel, the use of multi-antenna techniques in some practical
and exible fading wiretap channels such as two-wave with diuse power has not been
examined. In this thesis, new analytical frameworks are developed to tackle these issues.
Cognitive Radio: In cognitive radio networks, the data of the secondary network
needs to be protected, since the eavesdroppers or malicious primary users may intercept
it. Although existing works [8{14] laid a solid foundation for understanding the role of
physical layer security in cognitive radio networks, the impact of multi-antenna wiretap
channels in cognitive networks with passive eavesdropping is less well understood. Key
performance parameters such as secrecy diversity order and secrecy array gain under
interference power constraint in cognitive radio networks have not been addressed in the
existing literature.
Single Carrier Systems: Single carrier transmission is now being adopted in sev-
eral wireless systems such as millimeter wave wireless personal area networks (WPAN)
targeting in-ight entertainment distribution and wireless high-denition multimedia
interface (HDMI), high-speed backhaul, etc. [15]. In this thesis, physical layer security
in single carrier systems is rst introduced.
Wireless Sensor Networks: In wireless sensor networks, secure transmission is
crucial. Sensors are densely and randomly distributed in practical scenarios, which
brings new diculties for security. In this thesis, a stochastic geometry approach is
implemented to model the three-tier sensor network. The impact of network parameters
such as density of nodes on the secrecy performance is investigated.
5G Networks: Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) and millimeter
wave are two key technologies in 5G systems, which provide physical layer security
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with big opportunities [16]. In this thesis, opportunities and challenges of physical layer
security in massive MIMO and mmWave systems are investigated. In particular, some
traditional techniques such as articial noise need to be re-designed in 5G networks.
1.2 Physical Layer Security Related Works
Secure transmission in wireless networks is confronted with increasing problems due
to the rapid evolution of wireless network architectures [17{19]. The mobile terminals
are more vulnerable to eavesdropping compared to their xed counterparts, and the
implementation of conventional cryptographic protocols to ensure security becomes dif-
cult [20, 21]. In the 1970s, Aaron D. Wyner rst introduced physical layer security [22].
Triggered by the rapid evolution of wireless network architectures, the idea of enabling
security at physical layer has drawn attention of the wireless community [23, 24].
MIMO Wiretap Channel: Physical layer security has recently been addressed in
MIMO wiretap channels where the transmitter, the receiver, and/or the eavesdropper
are equipped with multiple antennas, as shown in [25{29] and the references therein.
Growing research interests have been devoted to examine physical layer security from
a practical perspective. To design secure transmission schemes in practice, [20] proposed
robust beamforming with articial noise to mitigate the eect of inaccurate channel state
information (CSI) in MIMO wiretap channels. An eective power distribution between
the information signal and articial noise was introduced in [30], which considered the use
of beamforming with articial noise over a multiple-input single-output (MISO) system
in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. Considering the availability
of partial CSI from the eavesdropper at the transmitter, [31] analyzed the secrecy out-
age probability in MISO wiretap channels. To facilitate low-complexity implementation,
transmit antenna selection was utilized to promote security with low feedback overhead
and low computational cost [6, 32]. Based on this, [33] examined the impact of antenna
correlation at the receiver and the eavesdropper on the secrecy performance. For con-
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dential broadcasting, [34] proposed the regularized channel inversion precoding for the
downlink of a multi-user MIMO system, where multiple users act as eavesdroppers. In
[34], power allocation to maximize the achievable secrecy sum rate was considered. To
provide valuable insights into the secrecy performance in practical fading channels, [35]
introduced two secrecy performance metrics, namely the average secrecy rates and the
secrecy outage probability, for single antenna wiretap channels. Inspired by this work,
[36] took into consideration the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) wiretap channel
and analyzed the secrecy outage probability with maximal-ratio combing (MRC) at the
receiver and the eavesdropper in Rayleigh fading.
Cognitive Radio Networks: Spectrum-sharing cognitive radio is a promising tech-
nique to improve ecient utilization of the scarce radio spectrum, in order to tackle con-
stant growth of numerous bandwidth-consuming wireless network users [37{39]. Security
in cognitive radio networks is critical as it is easily exposed to external threats. The
robust transmitter design via optimization for secure cognitive radio networks with and
without perfect channel state information (CSI) was addressed in [8] and [9], respectively.
In [10], cognitive relay beamforming was designed to maximize the secrecy rate, while
the interference on the primary receiver was kept below a predened value. In [11], relay
selection was proposed for cognitive radio with a single eavesdropper. The proposed
scheme in [11] selected a relay to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the cognitive
radio network subject to interference power constraint at the primary user. In [40], a
pair of cognitive relays was opportunistically selected, where the rst relay transmits
condential signals and the second relay transmits jamming signals. In [12], secure com-
munications with untrusted secondary users in cognitive radio was examined and the
achievable secrecy rate was derived. In [13], secure transmission in primary networks
with the help of trusted secondary users was considered in the presence of a malicious
eavesdropper attempting to obtain the primary user's messages. The proposed method
in [13] modeled the cooperative transmission as a Stackelberg game. In [14], it was
shown that non-cooperative jammers can be employed to improve the secrecy rate by
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compensating them with a fraction of bandwidth, which implies that secondary users
can act as non-cooperative jammers in cognitive radio networks.
Cooperative Relay: Cooperative relay communications has attracted much atten-
tion, due to its capabilities to establishing reliable links and increasing capacity [41].
Therefore, several recent works have considered physical layer security in cooperative
communications [42{48]. In [42], cooperative decode-and-forward (DF) relays were
deployed to perform distributed beamforming, and the secrecy diversity-multiplexing
tradeo was analyzed. In [43], several opportunistic relay selection schemes were pro-
posed to achieve secrecy. In [44], based on the DF, amplify-and-forward (AF) and coop-
erative jamming (CJ) relay protocols, relay cooperation was investigated to increase the
secrecy rate. In [45], optimal CJ using multiple relays for security enhancement was
studied and the condition for positive secrecy rate was derived. In [46], CJ and relay
chatting schemes for secrecy were proposed in opportunistic relay systems, which showed
that the proposed relay chatting scheme can perform better than CJ. Joint relay and jam-
mer selection for security enhancement was examined in one-way DF relay networks [47]
and two-way AF relay networks [48].
Untrusted Relay: Standards for relay-assisted transmission have been established,
such as the IEEE 802.11s and the IEEE 802.16j. Relay is a low-cost technique to increase
the coverage and maintain link reliability in wireless networks [18, 49]. However, if
the relay is untrusted or unauthenticated, it becomes an issue to keep the messages
condential between the source and the destination. The reason is that the untrusted
relay may belong to public networks that have low security clearance. In this case,
the untrusted relay acts as both a helper and an eavesdropper. The optimal secure
beamforming design for an AF MIMO untrusted relay system was proposed in [50].
Ergodic secrecy capacity for the untrusted relay selection was derived in [51], where
the destination-based jamming was used to achieve positive secrecy rate. The outage
performance in two-hop relaying with CJ was analyzed in [52], where all nodes are
equipped with a single antenna. In [53], antenna selection at the untrusted relay was
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considered, in which the relay selects the strongest source-relay link to receive the signal
and the strongest relay-destination link to forward the signal.
Wireless Sensor Networks: In wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the sensed data
is usually sensitive, and therefore secure transmission is critical in WSNs. Physical layer
security has been recently introduced in WSNs to combat eavesdropping [54{57]. In
[54], the downlink secure transmission from the mobile agent to the authorized user was
considered and two randomized array transmission schemes were developed. In [55], Dis-
tributed detection under secrecy constraint in an energy-constrainedWSN was addressed,
and the optimal operative solutions were analyzed. In [56], sensor transmissions were
observed by the authorized fusion center (FC) and unauthorized (third party) FC. It
was shown in [56] that the proposed security scheme at physical layer is highly scalable
with low-complexity, compared to the traditional network security protocols such as
cryptography and key management at the link and network layer. More recently in [57],
AF compressed sensing (CS) was introduced to provide secrecy against eavesdropping
in WSNs, and it was conrmed that the eavesdroppers cannot successfully decode the
signal when the number of eavesdropper is less than the sparsity level of the signal.
Cellular Networks: In cellular networks, physical layer security is important for
adding another level of protection. In [58], secure downlink transmission in cellular
networks was investigated, and the secrecy using linear precoding based on regularized
channel inversion was examined. In multi-cell environments, cell association and location
information of mobile users play an important role in determining the secrecy perfor-
mance [59]. In [60], the Kuhn-Munkres (KM) algorithm was introduced to solve the
radio resource allocation problem, in order to maximize the sum secrecy capacity for
both cellular and D2D users. In [61], it was shown that the interference from D2D trans-
mission can enhance the physical layer security of cellular communications. In [62], secure
transmission in multi-cell massive MIMO systems was exploited, which showed that ran-
dom articial noise (AN) generation can provide a favourable performance/complexity
tradeo compared to conventional AN.
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Millimeter Wave: As an innovative solution to meet the 5G's requirement, mil-
limeter wave (mmWave) communication systems use a huge swath of spectrum, from 30
to 300 GHz, to shift wireless transmissions away from the nearly fully occupied spectral
band of current wireless networks [63{65]. In [66], antenna subset modulation with large
antenna arrays was introduced to provide secure mmWave transmission at the physical
layer. In [67], the secrecy throughput using analog beamforming with phase shifters
was analyzed. Since secure mmWave transmission is a completely new and promising
research frontier, new secure transmission designs are needed by taking advantage of the
mmWave channel properties [63, 64].
1.3 Dissertation Organization and Contributions
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some fundamental
concepts such as physical layer security, stochastic geometry, and cooperative jamming.
Chapter 3 exploits the benets of MRC in two-wave with diuse power (TWDP) fading
wiretap channel. Chapter 4 provides an analytical framework for antenna selection in
Nakagami-m fading wiretap channel. Chapter 5 examines the eect of power constraint
on the secrecy in cognitive radio networks. Chapter 6 introduces physical layer security
in single carrier systems. Chapter 7 proposes cooperative jamming with optimal power
allocation in two-hop untrusted relay networks. Chapter 8 investigates secure transmis-
sion in three-tier WSNs with stochastic geometry. The main contributions of this thesis
are detailed as follows.
Chapter 3 focuses on physical layer security of MRC in TWDP fading channels. The
TWDP fading is of high exibility as it includes Rayleigh, Rician, and hyper-Rayleigh
fading as special cases. In such a channel model, two practical scenarios are considered,
namely the active eavesdropping scenario and the passive eavesdropping scenario. Key
performance parameters such as high SNR slope, power oset, and secrecy diversity order
are introduced and derived. The performance gap for dierent number of antennas is
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quantied.
Chapter 4 focuses on transmit antenna selection and receive generalized selection
combining in MIMO Nakagami-m fading wiretap channels. The aim is to construct a
unifying approach to evaluate the secrecy performance using practical antenna selection
techniques. Two distinct and practical scenarios are considered: 1) the legitimate receiver
is located close to the transmitter, and 2) the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are located close to the transmitter.
Chapter 5 focuses on secure cognitive transmission in passive eavesdropping. Both
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper use selection combining to receive the signal.
An analytical framework is rst presented. Under interference power constraint, closed-
form expressions for secrecy outage probability are derived. Based on the asymptotic
analysis, the secrecy diversity order and secrecy array gain are explicitly obtained.
Chapter 6 focuses on cooperative single carrier systems. A new relay selection crite-
rion is proposed to enhance the security. Closed-form expressions for key performance
metrics such as ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability are derived. It is
shown that the multipath diversity and multiuser diversity can be utilized to improve
the secrecy.
Chapter 7 focuses on security design in untrusted relay networks, which is dierent
from the relay networks presented in Chapter 6. In untrusted relay networks, the relay is
also an eavesdropper and intercepts the information transmitted by the source. Optimal
power allocation with cooperative jamming to maximize the ergodic secrecy capacity is
examined. The benets of using large antenna arrays are also shown.
Chapter 8 focuses on physical layer security in three-tier WSNs. The system topology
is built based on stochastic geometry. The aim is to evaluate the eect of the densities
of sensors, access points, and sinks on the secure transmission. The average secrecy rate
of the three-tier WSN is derived.
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Chapter 9 consists of conclusions and future work of this thesis. For future work,
two extensions of current work are proposed, i.e., imperfect channel state information
condition and multi-hop secure transmission with trusted/untrusted relays. In addi-
tion, physical layer security can safeguard data condentiality by exploiting the intrinsic
randomness of the communications medium and reaping the benets oered by the dis-
ruptive technologies to 5G. Among various technologies, two most promising ones are
discussed, namely, massive MIMO and millimeter wave. On the basis of the key prin-
ciples of each technology, the rich opportunities and the outstanding challenges that
security designers must tackle are identied. Such an identication is expected to deci-
sively advance the understanding of physical layer security of tomorrow.
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Chapter 2
Fundamental Concepts
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, fundamental concepts are claried: 1) The basic idea of physical layer
security is presented; 2) Physical layer security exploits the properties of the wireless
fading channel to transmit condential messages, therefore several practical and realistic
fading models are described; 3) Stochastic geometry is presented as a useful tool to model
large-scale wireless networks, in which large number of nodes are randomly located; 4)
Antenna selection is presented as a practical implementation design for the uplink of
4G long term evolution (LTE) and LTE-Advanced [5]. It is well known that using
antenna selection can achieve the full diversity gain with less number of radio frequency
(RF) electronics [68]; 5) Relay protocols are discussed. When the relay is untrusted,
secure transmission cannot be achieved by using conventional protocols such as amplify-
and-forward and decode-and-forward. The implementation of cooperative jamming can
help to achieve positive secrecy rate in untrusted relay networks; 6) Cognitive radio is
discussed as an eective way to cope with the scarce spectrum and improve the spec-
trum eciency [69]; 7) Single carrier systems is presented as an important technology
to support high-speed short-range transmission. It is well-known that single carrier
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Figure 2.1: A basic wiretap channel.
transmission has a lower peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR) compared to orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM); and 8) Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is
discussed, motivated by its widespread use in industrial and scientic applications such
as environmental sensing, health monitoring, and military communications [70].
2.2 Physical Layer Security
Physical layer security is not a new paradigm, since it was rst proposed by Wyner
in the 1970s [22]. Triggered by new transmission techniques such as multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO), cooperative relaying, and emerging decentralized networks
such as ad-hoc and sensor networks, physical layer security as a low-complexity approach
has regained attention. Under physical layer secrecy constraint, various signal processing
techniques have been proposed and analyzed [71]. In [72], articial noise was designed
at the transmitter to confuse the eavesdropper and enhance the secrecy.
A basic wiretap channel is shown in Figure 2.1, where the transmitter (Alice) trans-
mits the secrecy information to the legitimate receiver (Bob), and the eavesdropper
(Eve) intends to maliciously obtain this information. In his pioneering work, Wyner has
shown that for a degraded eavesdropper's channel, Alice can transmit the condential
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information at a positive secrecy rate, and Eve cannot obtain any bits of information.
The secrecy capacity is characterized as [28, 35]
Cs = [CM   CE]+ ;
where CM is the main channel capacity, and CE is the eavesdropper's channel capacity.
In practice, Alice encodes a message block W k into a codeword Xn, and Eve receives
Y nw from the output of its channel. The equivocation rate of Eve is Re = H
 
W k
Y nw  =n,
which is the amount of ignorance that the eavesdropper has about a messageW k [28]. A
secrecy rate R can be achieved when R  Re, and Cs is the maximum of the achievable
secrecy rate [28].
2.3 Wireless Fading Channels
In this section, some typical fading channels are briey illustrated. Chapters 3 and 4
consider the two-wave with diuse power fading channel and Nakagami-m fading channel,
respectively, and Chapters 5-8 take into account the Rayleigh fading channel.
2.3.1 Two-wave with Diuse Power Fading
The two-wave with diuse power (TWDP) fading was rst modeled in [73] to charac-
terize the propagation scenario where the received signal contains two strong, specular
multipath waves. This fading model is of high exibility as it includes Rayleigh, Rician,
and hyper-Rayleigh fading as special cases. In particular, it was veried in [74] that the
TWDP fading model provides a more accurate way to represent real-world frequency-
selective fading data from wireless sensor networks. Moreover, it can be used to describe
a link worse than Rayleigh fading [75]. As such, some research attention has been paid
to examine the performance of wireless networks under TWDP fading. For example, the
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average bit error rate was analyzed in [76] for quadrature amplitude modulation and in
[77] for non-coherent multiple frequency-shift keying. More recently, the outage proba-
bility was derived in [78] for single decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks. In [79], the
symbol error rate was derived for multiple DF relay networks.
In Chapter 3, maximal ratio combining (MRC) is adopted to combine the TWDP
fading signals at the receiver. Hence, the PDF for the sum of TWDP fading channel
power gains after MRC is expressed as
f () =
1
2M
~LMX
l=1
ul
22
e 
+#l
22
1X
k=0

#l
22
k 1
k! (M + k   1)!
 
22
M+k 1
; (2.1)
where M is the number of receive antennas, ~LM = (2L)
M , L is the order of the PDF,
ul is the lth entry of u with u = ~a1 
   ~am 
    
 ~aM and ~am = [~a1    ~al    ~a2L],
~al = ab(l+1)=2c, where the rst ve values of faigLi=1 are given in Table II of [73],
#l = ln (!l), !l is the lth entry of ! with ! = ~b1 
    ~bm 
    
 ~bM and ~bm =
[exp (m;1)    exp (m;l)    exp (m;2L)], m;l = Km

1 + ( 1)lm cos b(l 1)=2c2L 1

22,Km
is the ratio of the total specular power to diuse waves, m is the relative strength of
the two specular components for the mth TWDP branch channel, and 22 is the average
power of the diuse waves. When Km = 0, TWDP fading reduces to Rayleigh fading,
and when Km 6= 0 and m = 0, TWDP fading reduces to Rician fading.
2.3.2 Nakagami-m Fading
Nakagami-m distribution has versatility in providing a good match to various empirically
obtained measurement data [80]. Moreover, it includes Rayleigh as a special case [81].
The PDF of the Nakagami-m channel power gain  is given by
f () =
mmm 1
(m  1)!m e
 m 
 ; (2.2)
where m is the fading severity parameter and  = E fg is the mean value.
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Figure 2.2: A three-tier HCNs with stochastic geometry, where macrocell base
stations (red circle) are overlaid with picocell bases stations (green
triangle) and femtocell base stations (blue square).
2.3.3 Rayleigh Fading
Rayleigh fading channel is commonly considered in the literature. When the multiple
reective paths are large in number and there is no line-of-sight signal component, the
envelope of the received signal  is statistically described by a Rayleigh probability
density function (PDF) [82], which can be expressed as
f () =
2

e 
2=; (2.3)
where  = E

2
	
.
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Figure 2.3: Hexagonal Cellular Networks.
2.4 Stochastic Geometry
In conventional system model, density of nodes, node mobility, and triangle inequalities
are usually ignored. Stochastic geometry is a useful tool to analyze the average behavior
over many spatial realizations of a network whose nodes are located according to some
distributions [83]. Recent studies such as [84{87] have shown that stochastic geometry
can well model the heterogeneous cellular networks (HCNs). As shown in Figure 2.2, a
Poisson point process (PPP) model is used for modeling the three-tier downlink HCNs.
The traditional hexagonal model with xed geometry (See Figure 2.3) cannot model the
unplanned networks such as femtocells [86]. Therefore, stochastic geometry is very useful
for modeling practical random and distributed networks such as wireless sensor networks
and ad-hoc networks.
In stochastic geometry theory, PPP is commonly-used in the literature such as [85,
88], which is dened as follows [83]:
Poisson Point Process (PPP) Denition: Let  be a locally nite measure on
some metric space E . A point process  is Poisson on E if
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 For all disjoint subsets A1,: : : ,An of E , the random variables  (Ai) are indepen-
dent;
 For all sets A of E , the random variables  (A) are Poisson;
A PPP can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous. In homogeneous PPP, the
density of the points is constant. A fundamental property of PPP is the Slivnyak's
theorem, which is as follows [89]:
Slivnyak's Theorem: Let  denote a PPP with intensity measure . For  almost
all x 2 Rd,
P !x () = P ( 2 ) ;
that is, the reduced Palm distribution P !x () of the PPP is equal to its original distribu-
tion.
Slivnyak's theorem shows that for a PPP including an arbitrary point x, it is identical
to the law of the original PPP if point x is ignored. Another useful property that
calculates the products over PPP is the probability generating functional (PGFL), which
is as follows [90]:
E
"Y
x2
f (x)
#
= exp

 
Z
Rn
(1  f (x))  (dx)

:
In Chapter 8, a stochastic geometry approach is proposed to model a three-tier wire-
less sensor network, where the positions of the sensors, access points, sinks, and eaves-
droppers are modeled following the independent homogeneous PPPs.
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2.5 Antenna Selection
2.5.1 Transmit Antenna Selection and Selection Combining
Transmit antenna selection (TAS) is a low-complexity transmission design, which demands
small feedback information. The core idea behind TAS is to select a single antenna that
maximizes the receive signal power. TAS achieves the full diversity gain with a single
RF chain and has been implemented in LTE systems.
Selection combining adopts the best receive antenna with the largest receive signal
power to receive the signal and save the RF chains compared to MRC with multiple
RF chains. It has been standardized in the IEEE 802.11n for WLAN [3] and the IEEE
802.16 for WiMAX [4]. In Chapter 5, selection combining at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper is considered.
2.5.2 Generalized Selection Combining
Generalized selection combining (GSC), or the so-called hybrid-selection/MRC (HS/MRC),
selects a subset of diversity branches with largest signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and com-
bines them using MRC. This diversity combining method oers a tradeo between the
performance advantage of MRC and the implementation advantage of SC [91]. With the
help of the moment generating function (MGF), the performance of GSC was examined
over Rayleigh fading [92] and Nakagami fading [93]. The impact of correlated Nakagami
fading on GSC was considered in [94, 95]. In [96, 97], the high SNR performance of
GSC was analyzed in various environments. In [98], approximations were presented for
the high SNR performance of GSC in relay networks over Nakagami-m fading channels.
Motivated by these prior works, new analytical results for secure communications with
GSC are provided in this thesis.
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2.6 Relay
Relay transmission has been widely studied [41, 99], since it can expand the coverage
and enhance the system performance. Many relay protocols have been proposed such as
amplify-and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), and compress-and-forward (CF)
etc. In this thesis, AF and DF are considered.
2.6.1 Amplify-and-Forward
In AF protocol, the source rst transmits the signal to the relay, then the relay amplies
the signal and forwards the signal to the destination [99, 100]. In two-hop AF relay
networks, based on the end-to-end (e2e) SNR, the achievable rate is expressed as [100]
Re2e = log2

1+
s;rr;d
1+s;r+r;d

; (2.4)
where s;r is the receive SNR at the relay and r;d is the receive SNR at the destination.
When the relay is untrusted as an eavesdropper, the secrecy rate is given by [51]
Rs = [Re2e   log2 (1 + s;r)]+ : (2.5)
Note that
s;rr;d
1+s;r+r;d
<min fs;r;r;dg  s;r:
The secrecy rate Rs in (2.5) is zero. Therefore, in two-hop untrusted relay networks,
secrecy cannot be achieved for AF transmission. Cooperative jamming is an appealing
scheme to achieve positive secrecy rate in two-hop untrusted relay networks [101], and
more details are discussed in the following Section 2.7.
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Alice
Bob
Eve
Jammer
Figure 2.4: A basic wiretap channel with an external cooperative jammer.
2.6.2 Decode-and-Forward
In DF protocol, relay rst decodes the signal from the source, then re-encodes it and
forwards it to the destination [99]. Therefore, the untrusted DF relay cannot be employed
to help forward condential signals.
2.7 Cooperative Jamming
Cooperative jamming is a security enhancement approach, which can be used to confuse
the external eavesdroppers [14, 102{104] or the untrusted relays [101, 105].
As shown in Figure 2.4, Alice transmits the condential signal to Bob, and Eve
intercepts the signal. The external cooperative jammer transmits the jamming signal
to confound Eve. In such a scenario, interference from the jamming signal should be
mitigated at Bob. If the interfering signal from the cooperative jammer can be shared
by Bob with specic method (e.g., use the seed of the random noise generator in a secure
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Figure 2.5: A two-hop untrusted relay networks with destination-based coop-
erative jamming.
fashion [106]), Bob can cancel the jamming signal. Another promising way is for the
jammer to use null-steering beamforming [104], i.e., the jamming signal is transmitted
using the null space of the channel between jammer and Bob. As such, Bob will not
receive the jamming signal.
In untrusted relay networks, destination-based cooperative jamming was proposed to
achieve positive secrecy rate [101]. As shown in Figure 2.5, there are two time slots for
each information transmission. In the rst time slot, while Alice transmits the infor-
mation signal, Bob transmits the jamming signal. In the second time slot, the relay
forwards the signals to Bob. Since Bob knows the jamming signal, it can easily cancel
the jamming signal. In Chapter 7, optimal power allocation with cooperative jamming
is proposed in two-hop untrusted relay networks.
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2.8 Cognitive Radio Networks
Frequency spectrum is an increasingly scarce and expensive wireless resource due to the
upsurge in demand for multimedia services in current and future generation wireless
networks. Unfortunately, recent measurement campaigns have found that the radio fre-
quency spectrum is not being eciently utilized [107{113]. Cognitive radio, proposed by
Mitola in [114], has the potential to mitigate such ineciency. Particularly, by allow-
ing a secondary user (SU) to reuse the radio spectrum that is licensed to a primary
user (PU), the scarcity of frequency spectrum can be alleviated. Several approaches to
cognitive radio such as overlay, interweave, and underlay have been considered [115].
Among them, the most promising approach is underlay spectrum sharing in which the
SU simultaneously transmits in the same radio spectrum as the PU, provided that the
secondary transmission does not exceed the maximum interference constraint set by the
primary network [116]. One of the drawbacks of underlay spectrum sharing is the need
to limit the transmit power of the SU transmitter (SU-Tx) to avoid any deleterious eect
on the PU receiver (PU-Rx). In some practical scenarios, the cognitive radio network
may not be feasible due to heavy pathloss and severe shadowing [117]. As such, several
advanced transmission technologies have been introduced to enhance the performance
of underlay spectrum sharing such as cognitive relaying [118] and cognitive multiuser
diversity [119]. In Chapter 5, secrecy outage for passive eavesdropping is rst examined
in cognitive radio network.
2.9 Single Carrier Transmission
In practice, multipath components frequently exist in wireless communication systems
due to multiple reectors, in which reectors cause a time dispersion and frequency selec-
tive fading. If the signal bandwidth is larger than the frequency coherence bandwidth or
the delay spread is larger than the symbol duration, the signal is distorted due to inter-
symbol interference (ISI). To avoid the use of equalizers in dealing with ISI, single carrier
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(SC) transmission is an alternative attractive solution which uses an increased symbol
duration by forming a transmission block symbol [120, 121], with additional cyclic prex
(CP) symbols in front of the transmission block symbol. Thus, compared to OFDM
transmission, a block-wise processing is necessary for CP-SC transmission. There are
several existing works and on-going activities in the context of CP-SC transmission in
several dierent domains, including non-cooperative systems, cooperative relaying sys-
tems, and spectrum sharing systems, as follows.
 Non-cooperative systems: Opportunistic scheduling was proposed in [122] to achieve
multiuser diversity. In [123], cyclic delay diversity (CDD) was employed for the
frequency-domain equalizer (FDE), whereas distributed space-frequency block cod-
ing was employed in CP-SC systems [124] to achieve transmit diversity gain. Sev-
eral channel estimators for CP-SC systems were investigated in [125{127].
 Cooperative relaying systems: For several relaying protocols such as DF and AF,
as well as project and forward relaying [128], optimal power allocation [129], new
receiver design [130], optimal training sequences for channel estimation [131], and
best terminal selection [132] were proposed to enhance the performance.
 Spectrum sharing systems: For cooperative spectrum sharing [133, 134], and non-
cooperative spectrum sharing [135], CP-SC transmission was proposed to exam-
ine the impact of multipath diversity on the system performance, by taking into
account several performance indicators such as outage probability, symbol error
rate, and ergodic capacity.
In Chapter 6, physical layer security is rst introduced in single carrier system. An
analytical framework is presented and key performance parameters such as multiplexing
gain and secrecy diversity gain are explicitly demonstrated.
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Sensor
Gateway
Figure 2.6: Multihop architecture in wireless sensor networks.
2.10 Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted considerable attention from industry
and academia, due to its civilian and military applications [70]. In WSNs, the low-power
low-cost sensors are densely deployed. As shown in Figure 2.6, sensors are randomly
located, and sensed data are routed back to the gateway through multihop transmission.
Since the sensors are battery-powered devices, it is important to save the sensors'energy,
in order to prolong the lifetime of the network. In [136], the delay-aware data collection
network structure in WSNs was investigated, in which the delays in the data collection
process can be shortened. In [137], an energy-ecient hybrid data collection scheme was
proposed and it is shown that substantial energy saving is achieved. In practice, sensors
are located in the remote areas, and mobile sinks or data collectors are employed to
collect the sensed data [138, 139]. In [138], the impact of density of data collectors on
the the successful connectivity probability was examined based on stochastic geometry
model. In [139], the use of pairwise key predistribution scheme was developed to provide
authentication and pairwise key establishment between the sensors and mobile sinks.
In Chapter 8, physical layer security in three-tier wireless sensor networks is proposed,
where the sensors communicate with sinks with the help of access points in the presence
of eavesdropping.
Chapter 3
Physical Layer Security
Enhancement in Two-Wave with
Diuse Power Fading Channels
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, physical layer security enhancement in the single-input multiple-output
(SIMO) wiretap channel with two-wave with diuse power (TWDP) fading is examined.
In this wiretap channel, a single antenna transmitter sends condential information to
an M -antenna receiver, while an N -antenna eavesdropper overhears the transmission.
To leverage the benets of multiple antennas, we assume that maximal-rational combin-
ing (MRC) is applied at the receiver and the eavesdropper. We address two practical
eavesdropping scenarios. In the rst scenario, we consider that the eavesdropper's chan-
nel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter. In the second scenario, we
consider that the eavesdropper's CSI is not available at the transmitter. For the rst sce-
nario, we characterize the average secrecy capacity as the principal security performance
metric. Since the CSI of the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter, the transmitter
adapts its transmission rate in order to achieve perfect secrecy. For the second scenario,
we characterize the secrecy outage probability as the principal security metric. Since
the CSI of the eavesdropper is not available at the transmitter, the transmitter selects a
27
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constant secrecy rate and perfect secrecy is not always guaranteed.
Notation: ()T denotes the transpose operator, ()H denotes the conjugate transpose
operator, kk denotes the Euclidean norm, IM denotes theMM identity matrix, 0MN
denotes the M  N zero matrix, E [] denotes the expectation operator, 
 denotes the
kronecker product operator, bxc denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x, and
o () denotes the higher order terms.
3.2 System Model and Channel Statistical Properties
3.2.1 System Model
Figure 3.1 depicts a SIMO wiretap channel where the transmitter (Alice) encodes her
messages and transmits the codewords to the legitimate receiver (Bob), while the mali-
cious eavesdropper (Eve) overhears the transmission. We denote the channel between
Alice and Bob as the main channel, and the channel between Alice and Eve as the
eavesdropper's channel. We assume that Alice is equipped with a single antenna, Bob
is equipped with M antennas, and Eve is equipped with N antennas. In this wiretap
channel, the secrecy capacity CS is dened as [35]
CS = [CM   CN ]+ ; (3.1)
where CM = log2 (1 + M ) is the capacity of the main channel and CN = log2 (1 + N )
is the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. Here, we denote M as the instantaneous
received SNR of the main channel and N as the instantaneous received SNR of the
eavesdropper's channel. It is evident from (3.1) that CS increases with CM and dimin-
ishes with CN . Motivated by this, Bob applies MRC to combine the received signals
and maximize the received SNR. This allows Bob to exploit the M -antenna diversity
and maximize the probability of secure transmission. On the other hand, Eve applies
MRC to exploit the N -antenna diversity and maximize the probability of successful
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a SIMO wiretap channel, where anN -antenna eaves-
dropper (Eve) overhears the transmission from a single antenna
transmitter (Alice) to an M -antenna legitimate receiver (Bob).
eavesdropping.
For this wiretap channel, we take into account two distinct scenarios: 1) active eaves-
dropping and 2) passive eavesdropping. In active eavesdropping, the CSI of the main
channel and the eavesdropper's channel are available at Alice. Based on the CSI of these
two channels, Alice calculates CM and CN and then determine CS according to (3.1).
After this, Alice transmits its messages at a secrecy rate no higher than CS . In this
scenario, perfect secrecy is always guaranteed. In passive eavesdropping, the CSI of the
main channel is available at Alice but the CSI of the eavesdropper's channel is not known
at Alice. As such, Alice selects a constant secrecy rate RS to transmit its messages. In
this scenario, perfect secrecy is achieved when RS < CS , and is compromised otherwise.
To perform secure transmission, Alice encodes the message block w into the codeword
x = [x (1) ;    ; x (l) ;    ; x (L)],where L is the length of x. This codeword is subject
to the average power constraint 1L
PL
l=1E
h
jx (l)j2
i
 P . We assume that both the
main channel and the eavesdropper's channel are quasi-static fading channels where the
channel coecients are constant for each transmission block but vary independently
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between dierent blocks. At the lth time slot, the MRC-combined signal vector at Bob
is written as
yM (l) = h
H
MhMx (l) + h
H
MnM ; (3.2)
where hM is the M  1 main channel vector and nM  CNM1
 
0M1; 2MIM

is the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at Bob. Based on (3.2), the instantaneous
SNR of the main channel is given by M = khMk2P=2M . Correspondingly, the average
SNR of the main channel is given by M = E
h
khMk2
i
P=2M . In the eavesdropper's
channel, the MRC-combined signal vector at Eve is written as
yN (l) = h
H
NhNx (l) + h
H
NnN ; (3.3)
where hN is the N  1 eavesdropper's channel vector and nN  CNN1
 
0N1; 2NIN

is the AWGN vector at Eve. Based on (3.3), the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdrop-
per's channel is given by N = khNk2P=2N . Correspondingly, the average SNR of the
eavesdropper's channel is given by N = E
h
khNk2
i
P=2N .
3.2.2 Channel Statistical Properties
In the wiretap channel, we assume that the main channel and eavesdropper's channel are
subject to independent and non-identically distributed (i.n.i.d.) TWDP fading. Accord-
ing to [78], the probability density function (PDF) of M is given by
fM () =
1
2MM
~LMX
l=1
uM;l
22M
e
 


M

+#M;l
22
M
1X
k=0

#M;l
22M
k
 1
k! (M + k   1)!


22MM
M+k 1
; (3.4)
where ~LM = (2L)
M , L is the order of the PDF, uM;l is the lth entry of uM with
uM = ~a1
  ~am
  
~aM and ~am = [~a1    ~al    ~a2L], ~al = ab(l+1)=2c, where the rst ve
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values of faigLi=1 are given in Table II of [73], #M;l = ln(!M;l), !M;l is the lth entry of
!M with !M =
~b1
   ~bm
  
~bM and ~bm = [exp (m;1)    exp (m;l)    exp (m;2L)],
m;l = Km

1 + ( 1)lm cos b(l 1)=2c2L 1

22M , Km is the ratio of the total specular power
to diuse waves, and m is the relative strength of the two specular components for the
mth TWDP branch channel at Bob. Based on (3.4), the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of M is derived using [140, eq. (3.351.1)] as
FM () =
Z 
0
fM (x)dx
= 1  1
2M
e
  
22
M
M
~LMX
l=1
uM;le
 #M;l
22
M
1X
k=0
1
k!

#M;l
22M
k M+k 1X
i=0
1
i!


22MM
i
: (3.5)
Similarly, the PDF and CDF of N are given by
fN () =
1
2NN
~LNX
l=1
uN;l
22N
e
 


N

+#N;l
22
N
1X
k=0

#N;l
22N
k
1
k! (N + k   1)!


22NN
N+k 1
(3.6)
and
FN () =1 
1
2N
e
  
22
N
N
~LNX
l=1
uN;le
 #N;l
22
N
1X
k=0
1
k!

#N;l
22N
k N+k 1X
i=0
1
i!


22NN
i
: (3.7)
respectively, where ~LN = (2L)
N , uN;l is the lth entry of uN with uN = ~a1 
   ~an 

   
 ~aN and ~an = [~a1    ~al    ~a2L], ~al = ab(l+1)=2c, !N;l is the lth entry of !N
with !N =
~b1 
    ~bn 
    
 ~bN and ~bn = [exp (n;1)    exp (n;l)    exp (n;2L)],
n;l = Kn

1 + ( 1)ln cos b(l 1)=2c2L 1

22N , Kn is the ratio of the total specular power
to diuse waves, and n is the relative strength of the two specular components for the
nth TWDP branch channel at Eve.
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3.3 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity in Active Eavesdropping Sce-
nario
In this section, we concentrate on active eavesdropping where Alice adapts its trans-
mission rate based on CM and CN and thus guarantees perfect secrecy. In such a
scenario, ergodic secrecy capacity is a pivotal and practical performance metric to quan-
tify the maximum average achievable secrecy rate [35]. Therefore, we derive new exact
and asymptotic closed-form expressions for the ergodic secrecy capacity. Based on the
asymptotic result, we characterize the high SNR slope and the high SNR power oset
which explicitly capture the impact of the channel parameters on the ergodic secrecy
capacity at high SNRs [141]. These new closed-form results encompass Rayleigh fad-
ing and Rician fading as special cases. To the best of my knowledge, the analytical
framework and the results presented in this section are new.
3.3.1 Exact Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The ergodic secrecy capacity is the average of the instantaneous secrecy capacity CS over
M and N . We formulate the ergodic secrecy capacity as
CS =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
CSfM (1) fN (2)d1d2
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
CSfN (2) d2

| {z }
~1
fM (1) d1: (3.8)
According to (3.1), we rst express ~1 in (4.10) as
~1 =
Z 1
0
(log2 (1 + 1)  log2 (1 + 2)) fN (2) d2: (3.9)
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Utilizing integration by parts and applying some algebraic manipulations, we derive
(4.11) as
~1 =log2 (1 + 1)FN (1) 
Z 1
0
log2 (1 + 2) fN (2) d2
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FN (2)
1 + 2
d2: (3.10)
Substituting (4.12) into (4.10), we rewrite the ergodic secrecy capacity as
CS =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FN (2)
1 + 2
d2

fM (1) d1: (3.11)
Changing the order of integration in (A.3.1) with the help of [140, eq. (4.611.1)], we
obtain
CS =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FN (2)
1 + 2
[1  FM (2)] d2: (3.12)
It is shown in (3.12) that CS depends on the statistics of the main channel and the
eavesdropper's channel. Substituting (3.5) and (3.7) into (3.12) and applying [140, eq.
(1.111)] and [140, eq. (3.351.2)] to solve the resultant integrals, we derive the exact
ergodic secrecy capacity as (3.13), where Ei () is the exponential integral function given
by Ei () = e

22
R1

22
e x
x dx.
3.3.2 Asymptotic Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
We proceed to derive the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity to examine the maximum
average achievable secrecy rate in the high SNR regime. To do so, we consider that the
average SNR of the main channel is suciently high, i.e., M ! 11. We maintain the
consideration of arbitrary values of the average SNR of the eavesdropper's channel.
We commence the asymptotic analysis by presenting the rst order expansion of
1We note that as N !1, the probability of successful eavesdropping approaches one. As such, we
do not consider N !1.
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CS =
1
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FM () in the high SNR regime. Applying the Taylor series expansion truncated to the
kth order given by ex =
Pk
j=0 x
j=j! + o
 
xk

[142] in (3.5), we derive the rst order
expansion of FM () as
FM () = 1 
1
2M
~LMX
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uM;le
 #M;l
22
1X
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1
k!

#M;l
22
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
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To facilitate our asymptotic analysis, we rewrite (3.7) as FN () = 1 N (), where
N () =
1
2N
e
  
22
N
N
~LNX
l=1
uN;le
 #N;l
22
N
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1
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:
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It follows that (A.3.1) is re-expressed as
CS =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
1  N (2)
1+2
d2

fM (1)d1
= 1   2; (3.15)
where
1 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + 1) fM (1)d1 (3.16)
and
2 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
N (2)
1+2
fM (1)d2d1: (3.17)
We next derive the asymptotic expressions for 1 and 2. In the high SNR regime
with M !1, we have ln (1 + 1)  ln (1). As such, we apply [140, eq. (4.352.1)] and
perform some algebraic manipulations to derive the asymptotic expression for 1 as
11 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1) fM (1)d1
=log2
 
22M

+
1
2M ln 2
~LMX
l=1
uM;le
 #M;l
22
1X
k=0
 (M + k)
k!

#M;l
22
k
; (3.18)
where  () is the digamma function [143].
To derive the asymptotic expression for 2, we change the order of integration in
(3.17) and rewrite 2 as
2 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
N (2)
1+2
[1  FM (2)]d2: (3.19)
From (3.14), we nd that FM ()  0 when M !1. Applying some algebraic manip-
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ulations, we derive the asymptotic expression for 2 as
12 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
N (2)
1+2
d2
=
1
2N ln 2
~LNX
l=1
uN;le
 #N;l
22
1X
k=0

#N;l
22
k
k!
N+k 1X
i=0
 (N ; i)
i!
; (3.20)
where
 (N ; i) =Ei

1
N

  1
22N
i
+
iX
q=1

i
q

  1
22N
i q q 1X
t=0
(q   1)!
t!

1
22N
t
:
(3.21)
Finally, by substituting 11 in (3.18) and 12 in (3.20) into (3.15), the asymptotic ergodic
secrecy capacity C
1
S is derived as
C
1
S =log2
 
22M

+
1
2M ln 2
~LMX
l=1
uM;le
 #M;l
22
1X
k=0
 (M + k)
k!

#M;l
22
k
  1
2N ln 2
~LNX
l=1
uN;le
 #N;l
22
1X
k=0

#N;l
22
k
k!
N+k 1X
i=0
1
i!
 (N ; i) : (3.22)
Based on (3.22), we evaluate the high SNR slope and the high SNR power oset, as
two key parameters determining the ergodic secrecy capacity in the high SNR regime
[141, 144]. Conveniently, we rewrite the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity in (3.22) in
a general form as
C
1
S = S1 (log2 (M )  L1) ; (3.23)
where S1 is the high SNR slope in bits/s/Hz/(3 dB) and L1 is the high SNR power
oset in 3 dB units.
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We rst express the high SNR slope as
S1 = lim
M!1
C
1
S
log2 (M )
: (3.24)
Substituting (3.22) into (4.24), we obtain
S1 = 1: (3.25)
From (4.25), we conclude that the number of antennas at Bob and Eve have no impact
on the high SNR slope.
We next express the high SNR power oset L1 as
L1 = lim
M!1
 
log2 (M ) 
C
1
S
S1
!
: (3.26)
It is clear from (4.26) that the eects of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel
on the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity reside in L1. Substituting (3.22) and (4.25)
into (4.26), we derive L1 as
L1 = LM1 + LN1; (3.27)
where
LM1 =  log2
 
22
  1
2M ln 2
~LMX
l=1
uM;le
 #M;l
22
1X
k=0
 (M + k)
k!

#M;l
22
k
(3.28)
and
LN1 = 12 : (3.29)
Based on (4.27), (3.28), and (3.29), we conclude that the contribution of the main channel
to L1 is characterized by LM1 and the contribution of the eavesdropper's channel to L1
is characterized by LN1. We highlight that LM1 assesses the benets of M on the ergodic
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Figure 3.2: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus M with N = 10 dB and N = 2.
secrecy capacity. Specically, LM1 decreases as M increases, and as such the ergodic
secrecy capacity increases. On the other hand, LN1 quanties the loss of ergodic secrecy
capacity due to eavesdropping. Specically, LN1 increases withN , and as such the ergodic
secrecy capacity decreases.
3.3.3 Numerical Examples
Figure 3.2 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus M for dierent M in TWDP
fading channels. We set K = 3 dB and  = 1. The exact and asymptotic ergodic
capacity results are obtained from (3.13) and (3.22), respectively. Evidently, the exact
curves match precisely with Monte Carlo simulations and the asymptotic curves well
approximate the exact ones in the high SNR regime. We rst see that the curves for
dierent M have the same secrecy capacity slope, which is indicated by (4.25). We also
see that the ergodic secrecy capacity increases with increasingM . This can be explained
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Figure 3.3: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus M with N = 10 dB and M = 4.
by the fact that increasing M brings about additional power gains via MRC. It follows
that LM1 in (3.28) decreases with increasing M and accordingly the high SNR power
oset L1 decreases.
Figure 3.3 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus M for dierent N in TWDP
fading channels. We set K = 3 dB and  = 1. We see that the ergodic secrecy capacity
decreases with increasing N . This is due to the fact that LN1 in (3.29) increases with
increasing N and accordingly the high SNR power oset L1 increases.
Figure 3.4 depicts the high SNR power oset for dierentM and N in TWDP fading
channels. We set K = 3 dB and  = 1. We rst see that for xed N = 2, increasing M
decreases L1, which increases the ergodic secrecy capacity. We also see that for xed
M = 2, increasing N increases L1, which decreases the ergodic secrecy capacity.
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set versus
N with 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3.3.4 Special Cases
We next present results for the special cases of Rayleigh fading and Rician fading.
Observing (4.24), we conrm that the high SNR slope, S1, is constant unity for Rayleigh
and Rician fading. As such, we provide simplied expressions for LM1 and LN1 in the
following two remarks.
Remark 1: For Rayleigh fading, LM1 in (3.28) reduces to
LM1 =   (M) log2e (3.30)
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and LN1 in (3.29) reduces to
LN1 =
1
ln 2
N 1X
i=0
1
i!
 (N ; i): (3.31)
In (3.30),  (M) can be expressed as  (M) =  C+PM 1k=1 1k [140, eq. (8.365.4)], where
C is the Euler's constant [140, eq. (8.367.1)]. We conrm that  (M) is an increasing
function of M . As such, an increase in M decreases LM1 and thus improves the ergodic
secrecy capacity. We also conrm that an increase in N increases LN1 and thus degrades
the ergodic secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we note that when the eavesdropper is in
absence, we have LN1 = 0 and L1 = LM1 . In this case, LM1 in (3.30) reduces to the high
SNR power oset of the SIMO Rayleigh fading channel, equivalent to [141, eq. (15)]
with a single transmit antenna.
Remark 2: For Rician fading, K is the Rician K-factor and 22 = 1K+1 . In this
case, LM1 in (3.28) reduces to
LM1 =  log2

1
1 +K

  e
 MK
ln 2
1X
k=0
(MK)k
k!
 (M + k) (3.32)
and LN1 in (3.29) reduces to
LN1 =
1
ln 2
e NK
1X
k=0
(NK)k
k!
N+k 1X
i=0
1
i!
 (N ; i): (3.33)
Taking the derivative of LN1 with respect to K, we conrm that dL
N1
dK  0. This indicates
that LN1 is an increasing function of K. As such, when the Rician K-factor of the
eavesdropper's channel increases, the high SNR power oset increases and the ergodic
secrecy capacity decreases.
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3.4 Secrecy Outage Probability in Passive Eavesdropping
Scenario
In this section, we focus on passive eavesdropping where Alice transmits condential
information at a constant secrecy rate. Perfect secrecy is only guaranteed when the
secrecy rate is lower than the instantaneous secrecy capacity, otherwise, perfect secrecy is
compromised. In such a scenario, secrecy outage probability is a useful security metric to
characterize the probability that perfect secrecy is compromised [35]. Motivated by this,
we derive new exact and asymptotic closed-form expressions for secrecy outage probabil-
ity. Based on the asymptotic expression, we examine two key performance parameters
governing secrecy outage probability in the high SNR regime, namely secrecy diversity
order and secrecy array gain. We further derive the probability of non-zero secrecy capac-
ity. This essentially represents the probability of existence of positive secrecy. These new
closed-form results encompass Rayleigh fading and Rician fading as special cases.
3.4.1 Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
We rst concentrate on the secrecy outage probability. Given the expected secrecy rate
RS , secrecy outage is declared when the instantaneous secrecy capacity CS drops below
RS . As such, the secrecy outage probability is given by
Pout (RS) = Pr (CS < RS)
=
Z 1
0
fN (2)FM
 
2RS (1+2)  1

d2: (3.34)
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Pout (RS) =1  e
  2RS 1
22M
2M+N
~LMX
l=1
1X
k=0

#M;l
22
k uM;le #M;l22
k!
M+k 1X
i=0
1
i!

~LNX
l1=1
1X
k1=0

#N;l1
22
k1 uN;l1e #N;l122
k1! (N + k1   1)! 
iX
j=0

i
j

2RS   1
22
i j
 2
RSjN+k1+j iM 
j
N (N + k1 + j   1)!
(2RSN + M )
N+k1+j
: (3.36)
Substituting (3.5) and (3.6) into (3.34), we re-express the secrecy outage probability as
Pout (RS) = 1  1
2M+NN
~LMX
l=1
1X
k=0

#M;l
22
k uM;le #M;l22
k!

M+k 1X
i=0
1
i!
~LNX
l1=1
1
22
1X
k1=0

#N;l1
22
k1 uN;l1e #N;l122
k1! (N + k1   1)!

Z 1
0
e
  2
22N

2
22N
N+k1 1
e
  2
RS (1+2) 1
22M

2RS (1 + 2)  1
22M
i
d2: (3.35)
Applying the binomial expansion [140, eq. (1.111)] and [140, eq. (3.351.3)] to solve the
integral in (3.35), we derive the exact secrecy outage probability as (3.36). This exact
expression is derived in closed-form. It consists of nite summations of exponential
functions and power functions.
3.4.2 Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
We now derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as M !1. This expression
allows us to examine the secrecy performance in the high SNR regime via two parameters,
namely the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain. Substituting (3.14) into
(3.34) and performing algebraic manipulations, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
is derived as
P1out (RS) = (GaM )
 Gd + o

 GdM

; (3.37)
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where the secrecy diversity order is given by
Gd =M (3.38)
and the secrecy array gain is given by
Ga =
24 1
2M+NM !
~LMX
l=1
uM;le
 #M;l
22
~LNX
l1=1
uN;l1e
 
#N;l1
22

1X
k=0

#N;l1
22
k
1
k! (N + k   1)!
MX
i=0

M
i
 
2RSN
i


2RS   1
22
M i
(N + k   1 + i)!
#  1
M
: (3.39)
It is evident from (3.38) that the secrecy diversity order is solely dependent on M and
is independent of N . Hence, the secrecy diversity order increases with the number of
antennas at Bob. It is also evident from (3.39) that the eavesdropper's channel exerts a
negative eect on the secrecy array gain. As such, increasing the number of antennas at
Eve decreases the secrecy array gain and thus degrades the secrecy outage probability.
3.4.3 Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity
According to (3.1), the non-zero secrecy capacity is achieved when M > N . As such,
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is given by
Pr (CS > 0) = Pr (M > N )
=
Z 1
0
fM (1)FN (1) d1: (3.40)
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Substituting (3.4) and (3.7) into (3.40) yields
Pr (CS > 0) = 1  1
2M+NM
~LNX
l=1
uN;le
 #N;l
22
1X
k=0

#N;l
22
k
k!

N+k 1X
i=0
~LMX
l1=1
uM;l1e
 
#M;l1
22
1X
k1=0

#M;l1
22
k1
k1!22 (M + k1   1)!i!

Z 1
0

M
22M
M+k1 1 M
22N
i
e
  M
22

1
M
+ 1
N

dM : (3.41)
Employing [140, eq. (3.351.3)] to solve the integral in (3.41), we derive the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity as
Pr (CS > 0) = 1  1
2M+N
~LNX
l=1
1X
k=0

#N;l
22
k uN;le #N;l22
k!
~LMX
l1=1
1X
k1=0
N+k 1X
i=0

M + k1   1 + i
i



#M;l1
22
k1 uM;l1e #M;l122 MiNM+k1
k1!(M+N )
M+k1+i
: (3.42)
For the special case of Rayleigh fading where no specular waves exist in the main channel
and eavesdropper's channel, (3.42) reduces to [36, eq. (3)]. This highlights the validity
and generality of our result.
3.4.4 Numerical Examples
Figure 3.5 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus M for dierent M in TWDP
fading channels. We set RS = 1 bit/s/Hz and K = 3 dB. The exact and asymptotic
secrecy outage probability results are obtained from (3.36) and (3.37), respectively. Pre-
cise agreement can be seen between the exact curves and the Monte Carlo simulations.
We also see that the asymptotic curves accurately predict the secrecy diversity order
and the secrecy array gain. We observe that the secrecy outage probability decreases
dramatically with increasing M . This can be explained by the fact that M increases the
secrecy diversity order.
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Figure 3.5: Secrecy outage probability versus M with N = 10 dB, N = 2,
and  = 1.
Figure 3.6 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus M for dierent N in TWDP
fading channels. We set RS = 1 bit/s/Hz and K = 3 dB. We see that the secrecy outage
probability curves are parallel in the high SNR regime. This is due to the fact that the
secrecy diversity order is independent of N as indicated by (3.38). We also see that
the secrecy outage probability increases with N . This is explained by the fact that the
secrecy array gain decreases with increasing N as indicated by (3.39).
3.4.5 Special Cases
We next examine results for the special cases of Rayleigh fading and Rician fading. Based
on (3.38), we conrm that the secrecy diversity order is maintained atM for Rayleigh and
Rician fading. We then oer the following two remarks to present simplied expressions
for the exact secrecy outage probability and the secrecy array gain.
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Figure 3.6: Secrecy outage probability versus M with N = 10 dB, M = 4,
and  = 1.
Remark 1: For Rayleigh fading, the exact secrecy outage probability in (3.36)
reduces to
Pout (RS) =1  e
  2RS 1
M
(N   1)!
M 1X
i=0
iX
j=0

i
j
 
2RS   1i j 2RSjN+j iM jN (N + j   1)!
i!(2RSN + M )
N+j
: (3.43)
The secrecy array gain in (3.35) reduces to
Ga =
"
MX
i=0

M
i

2RSi
 
2RS   1M i iN  (N + i)
M !  (N)
#  1
M
: (3.44)
Combining the rst two terms of [36, eq. (6)], we nd that the exact secrecy outage
probability in [36] can be simplied as (3.43). From (3.44), we see that the secrecy array
gain decreases with increasing N and N .
Remark 2: For Rician fading, the exact secrecy outage probability in (3.36) reduces
Chapter 3. Physical Layer Security Enhancement in Two-Wave with Diuse Power
Fading Channels 48
to
Pout (RS) =1  e 
2RS 1
22M
 NK 1X
k=0
(MK)ke MK
k!
M+k 1X
i=0

1X
k1=0
(NK)k1
i!k1! (N + k1   1)!
iX
j=0

i
j

2RS   1
22
i j
 2
RSjN+k1+j iM 
j
N (N + k1 + j   1)!
(2RSN + M )
N+k1+j
: (3.45)
The secrecy array gain in (3.35) reduces to
Ga =
"
e (M+N)K
M !
1X
k=0
(NK)k
k! (N + k   1)!
MX
i=0

M
i

2RSi
   2RS   1 (K + 1)M i   (N + k + i) iNi  1M : (3.46)
Taking the derivative of Ga with respect to K, we conrm that
dGa
dK > 0, which indicates
that Ga is an increasing function of the Rician K-factor. Thus, we conrm that the
secrecy array gain increases with K.
3.4.6 Performance Gap
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance loss when the number of antennas at
Eve increases from N to N+1. As indicated by (3.38) and (3.39), increasing the number
of antennas at Eve only impacts the secrecy array gain. As such, we derive the SNR gap
between N and N + 1 antennas as a simple ratio of their respective secrecy array gains.
Motivated by this, we dene the SNR gap between N and N + 1 antennas as
Ga (N + 1)
Ga (N)

dB
= 10log10

Ga (N + 1)
Ga (N)

: (3.47)
For TWDP fading channels, the SNR gap between N and N + 1 antennas is calculated
using (3.39) together with (3.47). For the special cases of Rayleigh fading and Rician
fading, we proceed to provide some useful insights in the following remarks.
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Remark 3: For Rayleigh fading, based on (3.44) and (3.47), the SNR gap between
N and N + 1 antennas is characterized as
Ga (N + 1)
Ga (N)

dB
=  10
M
log10 (1 +$) ; (3.48)
where $ is given by
$ =
PM
i=0
 
M
i

i
 
2RS   1M i2RSi  (N + i) iN
N
PM
i=0
 
M
i

(2RS   1)M i2RSi  (N + i) iN
: (3.49)
From (3.48), increasing N to N + 1 antennas results in an SNR loss of 10M log10 (1 +$)
dB.
Remark 4: For Rician fading, based on (3.46) and (3.47), the SNR gap between N
and N + 1 antennas is characterized as
Ga (N + 1)
Ga (N)

dB
=
10K
M
log10e 
10
M
log10

1 +
$1
$2

; (3.50)
where
$1 =
1X
k=0
k 1X
j=0

k
j

N jKk
k! (N + k)!
MX
i=0

M
i
 
2RS   1M i (K + 1)M i 2RSi (N + k + i)!iN
+
1X
k=0
(NK)k
k! (N + k)!
MX
i=0

M
i

i
 
2RS   1M i (K + 1)M i 2RSi (N + k   1 + i)!iN (3.51)
and
$2 =
1X
k=0
(NK)k
k! (N + k   1)!
MX
i=0

M
i
 
2RS   1M i(K + 1)M i2RSi (N + k   1 + i)!iN :
(3.52)
From (3.50), increasingN toN+1 antennas results in an SNR loss of 10M log10

1 + $1$2

 
10K
M log10e dB. For the special case of non-line-of-sight with K = 0, (3.50) reduces to
(3.48).
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Figure 3.7: SNR gap versus N with N = 10 dB and M = 4 in three dierent
fading scenarios.
Figure 3.7 depicts the SNR gap between N and N + 1 antennas for three dierent
fading scenarios: 1) TWDP fading with K = 3 dB and  = 1, 2) Rician fading with
K = 3 dB and  = 0, and 3) Rayleigh fading. We set RS = 1 bit/s/Hz. We see that
the SNR gap diminishes with increasing N . We also see that the SNR gap for all three
fading scenarios approach each other for large N .
3.5 Conclusions
Physical layer security of MRC systems in TWDP fading channels was analyzed. Two
practical scenarios were taken into account, depending on whether or not the CSI of
the eavesdropper is known at the transmitter. For the rst scenario where Eve's CSI is
not known, new expressions for the exact and asymptotic average secrecy capacity were
derived. Based on these, it has been demonstrated that the high SNR slope is one. The
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joint impacts of the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel on the average secrecy
capacity via the high SNR power oset were characterized. For the second scenario
where Eve's CSI is known, new expressions for the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage
probability were derived. Based on these, it is shown that the secrecy diversity order
is solely dependent on the number of receive antennas at the legitimate receiver and
independent of the number of antennas at the eavesdropper. We further examined the
performance loss by presenting the SNR gap between N and N + 1 antennas. Based on
the SNR gap, the loss of secrecy array gain with increasing number of antennas at the
eavesdropper is accurately quantied.
Chapter 4
Secure Transmission with
Antenna Selection in MIMO
Nakagami-m Fading Channels
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, transmit antenna selection (TAS) with GSC (TAS/GSC) for secure
transmissions in MIMO wiretap channels is proposed. The proposed protocol combines
the advantages of TAS and GSC in multiple antenna transmissions. Two eavesdropping
scenarios are addressed: 1) Passive eavesdropping and 2) active eavesdropping. For
passive eavesdropping, the secrecy outage probability is characterized as the fundamental
security metric. For active eavesdropping, the average secrecy rate is characterized as the
fundamental security metric. New asymptotic expressions for the average secrecy rate
and secrecy outage probability in the high SNR regime are derived for two important
cases: 1) The legitimate receiver is located close to the transmitter, and 2) the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper are located close to the transmitter.
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Notation: In this chapter, ()T denotes the transpose operator, IM denotes theMM
identity matrix, 0MN denotes the M  N zero matrix, E [] denotes the expectation
operator, F'() denotes the CDF of random variable (RV) ', f'() denotes the PDF
of ', sgn () denotes the signum function, o () denotes the higher order terms, and
[x]+ = maxfx; 0g.
4.2 System Model
A MIMO wiretap channel model which consists of a transmitter (Alice) with NA anten-
nas, a legitimate receiver (Bob) with NB antennas, and an eavesdropper (Eve) with
NE antennas is considered. The main channel (Alice-Bob) and the eavesdropper's
channel (Alice-Eve) are assumed to undergo quasi-static Nakagami-m fading with fad-
ing parameters mB and mE , respectively. In the main channel, Alice selects a single
transmit antenna among NA antennas that maximizes the GSC output SNR at Bob,
while Bob combines the LB (1  LB  NB) strongest receive antennas. In the eaves-
dropper's channel, Eve combines the LE (1  LE  NE) strongest receive antennas.
The channel power gain from the pth transmit antenna to the lBth receive antenna
at Bob is denoted as jhp;lB j2 with E
h
jhp;lB j2
i
= 
1, p = 1;    ;NA, lB= 1;    ;NB.
The channel power gain from the pth transmit antenna to the lEth receive antenna at
Eve is denoted as jgp;lE j2 with E
h
jgp;lE j2
i
= 
2, lE= 1;    ;NE . Based on GSC, we
arrange
nhp;(lB)2; 1  lB  NBo in descending order as hp;(1)2  hp;(2)2     hp;(NB)2, and ngp;(lE)2; 1  lE  NEo in descending order as gp;(1)2  gp;(2)2 
    gp;(NE)2. The index of the optimal transmit antenna is determined as
p = argmax
1pNA
8<:
LBX
lB=1
hp;(lB)2
9=; : (4.1)
Secure transmission is achieved by encoding the condential message block W into
a codeword x = [x (1) ;    ; x (l) ;    ; x (L)], where L is the length of x. The codeword
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is subject to an average power constraint 1L
PL
l=1 E
h
jx (l)j2
i
 P . In the main channel,
at time slot l, the received signal vector is given by yB (l) = hx (l) + nB (l), where h =
[hp;1; hp;2;    ; hp;NB ]T 2 CNB1 is the main channel vector between transmit antenna
p at Alice and the NB receive antennas at Bob, and nB (l)  CNNB1
 
0NB1; 
2
BINB

is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at Bob. We denote B = 
1
P
2B
as
the average SNR per antenna at Bob. Combining the subset of receive antennas with
the largest SNRs at Bob results in the instantaneous SNR in the main channel as
B =
LBX
lB=1
B(lB); (4.2)
where B(lB) =
hp;(lB)2 P2B . In the eavesdropper's channel, at time slot l, the received
signal vector is given by yE (l) = gx (l) + nE (l), where g = [gp;1; gp;2;    ; gp;NE ]T 2
CNE1 is the eavesdropper's channel vector between transmit antenna p at Alice and
the NE receive antennas at Eve, and nE (l)  CNNE1
 
0NE1; 
2
EINE

is the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at Eve. We denote E = 
2
P
2E
as the average SNR
per antenna at Eve. Combining the subset of receive antennas with the largest SNRs at
Eve results in the instantaneous SNR in the eavesdropper's channel as
E =
LEX
lE=1
(lE); (4.3)
where (lE) =
gp;(lE)2 P2E .
4.3 New Statistical Properties
In this section, we derive new closed-form expressions for the probability density function
(PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of B in the main channel, and
the PDF and the CDF of E in the eavesdropper's channel, which lay the foundation for
extracting several key secrecy performance indicators, namely the high SNR slope, the
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high SNR power oset, the secrecy diversity order, and the secrecy array gain. These
statistics are general in nature and as such are useful for determining the performance
of other wireless systems with GSC.
4.3.1 CDF and PDF of the SNR in the Main Channel
Theorem 1: The expressions for the CDF and the PDF of B are derived as
FB (x) =

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~xe x; (4.4)
fB (x) =

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~x 1e x (   x) ; (4.5)
where fP ,P
SB
P
S1B
  P
SkB
   P
SjSjB
, SB =
( 
n;1;    ; n;jSj
 jSjP
k=1
n;k = NA
)
, jSj is the car-
dinality of set S, and S denotes a set of (2mB + 1)-tuples satisfying the condition
S =
8><>: nk;0    ; nk;mB 1; nFk;0;    ; nFk;mB
mB 1X
i=0
nk;i = LB   1;
mBX
j=0
nFk;j = NB   LB
9>=>;;
thereby jSj =  mB+LB 2mB 1  mB+NB LBmB , SkB =
(
(nk;0;    ; nk;mBLB+bFk
mBLB+bFkP
n=0
nk;n =
n;k
)
, k = 1;    ; jSj, and ~, , and  are respectively given by
~ =
jSjY
k=1
 
ak a
F
k
(n1   1)!
(LB)
n1
n;k mBLB+bFkQ
n=0
`
nk;n
n
mBLB+b
F
kQ
n=0
nk;n!
!
;
 =
jSjX
k=1
mBLB+b
F
kX
n=0
nnk;n;  =
jSjX
k=1
mBLB+b
F
kX
n=0
nnk;n;
where n1 = b

k + b
F
k +mB, a

k , a
F
k , `n, b
F
k , b

k , n, and n are dened in Appendix A.1.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
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Theorem 2: In the high SNR regime with B ! 1, the asymptotic CDF of B is
given by
FB (x) =

LB
 
NB
LB
NAmB
B
mBNBNA
xmBNBNA
(mB   1)!(mB!)NB LB (mBNB)!
NA
0@X
SB
ak
 
bk +mB (NB   LB) +mB   1

!
(LB)
bk+mB(NB LB)+mB
1ANA ; (4.6)
where SB =

nk;0;    ; nk;mB 1
mB 1P
i=0
nk;i = LB   1

.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
4.3.2 CDF and PDF of the SNR in the Eavesdropper's Channel
Alice selects the strongest transmit antenna according to the channel power gains of
the main channel, which corresponds to selecting a random transmit antenna for Eve.
Hence, similar to (A.1.9) given in Appendix A, the expressions for the CDF and the
PDF of E are respectively derived as
FE (x) =
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=0
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`nx
ne nx; (4.7)
fE (x) =
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`nx
n 1e nx (n   nx);
(4.8)
where SE denotes a set of (2mE + 1)-tuples satisfying the condition
SE =
8><>: nk;0    ; nk;mE 1; nFk;0;    ; nFk;mE
mE 1X
i=0
nk;i = LE   1;
mEX
j=0
nFk;j = NE   LE
9>=>;:
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All the parameters in (4.7) and (4.8) are identical to those in Theorem 1 and are calcu-
lated accordingly.
4.4 Average Secrecy Rate
In this section, we focus on the active eavesdropping scenario1, where the CSI of the
eavesdropper's channel is also known at Alice. Following the wiretap channel in [28, 35],
Alice encodes a message block W k into a codeword Xn, and Eve receives Y nw from the
output of its channel. The equivocation rate of Eve is Re = H
 
W k
Y nw  =n, which is the
amount of ignorance that the eavesdropper has about a message W k [28]. In the active
eavesdropping scenario, Alice can adapt the achievable secrecy rate R such that R 
Re [28, 35]. Here, We focus on the maximum achievable secrecy rate Cs = Re [28, 35],
which is characterized as [28, 35, 145, 146]
Cs = [CB   CE ]+; (4.9)
where CB = log2 (1 + B) is the capacity of the main channel and CE = log2 (1 + E)
is the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. Since the CSI of eavesdropper's channel
is available to Alice, Alice can transmit condential messages at a rate Cs, to guarantee
perfect secrecy.
In active eavesdropping scenario, the average secrecy rate is essentially a fundamental
secrecy performance metric. We derive new exact and asymptotic expressions for the
average secrecy rate. Based on the asymptotic expressions, we characterize the average
secrecy rate in terms of the high SNR slope and the high SNR power oset, to explicitly
capture the impact of arbitrary antennas and channel parameters on the average secrecy
rate at high SNR [141].
1In this scenario, the eavesdropper is active [35]. Such a scenario is particularly applicable in networks
combining multicast and unicast transmissions, where the users play dual roles as legitimate receivers
for some signals and eavesdroppers for others [44].
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4.4.1 Exact Average Secrecy Rate
The average secrecy rate is the average of the secrecy rate Cs over B and E . As such,
the exact average secrecy rate is given by
Cs =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
CsfB (x1) fE (x2)dx1dx2
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
CsfE (x2) dx2

| {z }
!1
fB (x1) dx1: (4.10)
We rst calculate !1 in (4.10) as
!1 =
Z x1
0
(log2 (1 + x1)  log2 (1 + x2)) fE (x2) dx2: (4.11)
Using integration by parts, and applying some algebra, we derive (4.11) as
!1 = log2 (1+x1)FE (x1) 

log2 (1+x1)FE (x1) 
1
ln 2
Z x1
0
1
1+x2
FE (x2) dx2

=
1
ln 2
Z x1
0
FE (x2)
1 + x2
dx2: (4.12)
Substituting (4.12) into (4.10), and changing the order of integration, we obtain
Cs =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FE (x2)
1 + x2
Z 1
x2
fB (x1) dx1

dx2
=
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
FE (x2)
1 + x2
(1  FB (x2))dx2: (4.13)
Using the new statistical properties in Section III, we calculate (4.13) as
Cs =
LE
ln 2 (mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=0
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`n
"
n!	 (n + 1; n + 1; n)
 

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~ (n + )!	 (n +  + 1; n +  + 1; n + )#;
(4.14)
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where 	 (; ; ) is the conuent hypergeometric function [140, eq. (9.211.4)]. Our new
expression for the exact average secrecy rate in (4.14) applies to arbitrary numbers of
antennas, arbitrary fading parameters, and arbitrary average SNRs.
4.4.2 Asymptotic Average Secrecy Rate
In order to explicitly examine the performance in the high SNR regime, we proceed to
derive the asymptotic average secrecy rate. We take into account two realistic scenarios:
1) Bob is located close to Alice, which can be mathematically described as B !1 for
arbitrary E , and 2) Bob and Eve are located close to Alice, which can be mathematically
described as B !1 and E !1.
To facilitate the analysis, we rewrite the CDF of E as
FE (x) = 1 + E (x) ; (4.15)
where
E (x) =
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`nx
ne nx:
4.4.2.1 B !1
In this case, we introduce a new general form to derive the average secrecy rate in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: The asymptotic average secrecy rate is given by
C1s = 1 +2; (4.16)
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where
1 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (x1) fB (x1)dx1 (4.17)
and
2 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
E (x2)
1+x2
dx2: (4.18)
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Based on Theorem 3, we calculate the asymptotic average secrecy rate using the new
statistical properties in Section III. Specically, by substituting (4.5) into (4.17), and
employing [140, eq. (4.352.1)], 1 is derived as
1 =log2 (B)  log2 (mB) +
1
ln 2

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~~1; (4.19)
where ~~ = ~

mB
B
 
and
1 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0;  = 0; ~ = 0;
ln(~) + C;  = 0; ~ > 0;
  ( 1)!
(~)

;  > 0; ~ > 0;
(4.20)
In (4.20), C is the Euler's constant [140, eq. (8.367.1)] and ~ =

mB
B
 1
. It is worth
noting that ~~ and ~ are independent of B. We should also note that 1 in (4.19)
explicitly quanties the impact of the main channel on the average secrecy rate.
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Substituting E given in (4.15) into (4.18), we obtain 2
2 =
LE
ln 2 (mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k

 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`nn!	 (n + 1; n + 1; n); (4.21)
which explicitly quanties the impact of the eavesdropper's channel on the average
secrecy rate.
Based on (4.16), (4.19), and (4.21), we derive the asymptotic average secrecy rate as
C1s =log2 (B)  log2 (mB) +
1
ln 2

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!gX~~1 + LE
ln 2 (mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak
 aFk
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`nn!	 (n + 1; n + 1; r): (4.22)
Based on (4.22), we derive two key performance indicators that determine the average
secrecy rate at high SNR, namely the high SNR slope and the high SNR power oset [141,
147]. The asymptotic average secrecy rate in (4.22) can be conveniently re-expressed
as [141]
C1s = S1 (log2 (B)  L1) ; (4.23)
where S1 is the high SNR slope in bits/s/Hz/(3 dB) and L1 is the high SNR power
oset in 3 dB units. We note that the high SNR slope is also known as the maximum
multiplexing gain or the number of degrees of freedom [148]. The high SNR power
oset is a more intricate function which depends on the number of transmit and receive
antennas, as well as the channel characteristics [141, 147].
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The high SNR slope S1 is given by
S1 = lim
B!1
C1S
log2 (B)
: (4.24)
Substituting (4.22) into (4.24), we obtain
S1 = 1: (4.25)
From (4.25), we see that the eavesdropper's channel and the number of Bob's receive
antennas have no impact on the high SNR slope S1.
The high SNR power oset L1 is given by
L1 = lim
B!1

log2 (B) 
C1S
S1

: (4.26)
Substituting (4.22) and (4.25) into (4.26), we derive L1 as2
L1 = LB1(mB; NB; LB; NA) + LE1(mE ; NE ; LE ; E); (4.27)
where
LB1 (mB; NB; LB; NA) =log2 (mB) 
1
ln 2

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~~1 (4.28)
and
LE1(mE ; NE ; LE ; E) =  2: (4.29)
In (4.28), LB1 quanties the contribution of the main channel to the high SNR power
oset. In (4.29), LE1 quanties the contribution of the eavesdropper's channel to the
high SNR power oset. We next examine special cases of LB1 and LE1 in which these
2Here, we explicitly reveal the dependence of the high SNR power oset on mB , NA, NB , LB , mE ,
NE , LE , E .
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expressions reduce to more simple forms.
Corollary 1: For the special case of Rayleigh fading, where mB = mE = 1, LB1 in
(4.28) reduces to
LB1 (1; NB; LB; NA) =  
1
ln 2

LB

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~~1 (4.30)
and LE1 in (4.29) reduces to
LE1 (1; NE ; LE ; E) = 
1
ln 2

NE
LE
X
SFE
LEX
n=1
aFk `nn!	 (n + 1; n + 1; n) ; (4.31)
where SFE =
(
nFk;0; n
F
k;1
 1P
j=0
nFk;j = NE   LE
)
.
Corollary 2: For the special case of Rayleigh fading with TAS/MRC, where mB =
mE = 1, LB = NB, and LE = NE , LB1 in (4.28) reduces to
LB1 (1; NB; NB; NA) =  
1
ln 2
NA!
X
S1B
NBQ
n=1

 1
(n 1)!
n1;n
NBQ
n=0
n1;n!
; (4.32)
where S1B =
(
(n1;0;    ; n1;NB )j
NBP
n=0
n1;n = NA
)
and
 =
8><>:
ln(NA) + C;  = 0;
  ( 1)!
(NA)

;  > 0:
(4.33)
From (4.29), LE1 reduces to
LE1 (1; NE ; NE ; E) =
1
ln 2
NEX
n=1

1
E
n 1
	

n; n;
1
E

: (4.34)
It is clear from (4.34) that LE1 is an increasing function of NE . As such, when the
number of antennas at Eve increases, the high SNR power oset also increases, which in
Chapter 4. Secure Transmission with Antenna Selection in MIMO Nakagami-m Fading
Channels 64
turn decreases the average secrecy rate.
Corollary 3: For the special case of Rayleigh fading with TAS/SC, where mB =
mE = 1, LB = 1, and LE = 1, LB1 in (4.28) reduces to
LB1 (1; NB; 1; NA) = 
1
ln 2
(NB)
NANA!
gX~~sgn(~)(ln(~) + C): (4.35)
By applying [140, eq. (3.352.4)], LE1 in (4.29) reduces to
LE1 (1; NE ; 1; E) =
NE
ln 2
X
SFE
(NE   1)!
1Q
j=0
nFk;j !
( 1)nFk;1
 
sgn(nFk;1)
nFk;1 + 1
+1  sgn(nFk;1)
! 
 e
(nFk;1+1)
E Ei

 

nFk;1 + 1

E
!!
; (4.36)
where SFE =
(
nFk;0; n
F
k;1
 1P
j=0
nFk;j = NE   1
)
and Ei () is the exponential integral
function dened in [140, eq. (8.211.1)].
4.4.2.2 B !1 and E !1
In this case, the average secrecy rate can be easily obtained based on Theorem 3. We
only need to further provide the asymptotic 2 with E !1. Observing 1 in (4.19),
the asymptotic 2 is derived according to
2 =   (log2 (E)  log2 (mE))  ; (4.37)
where
 =
1
ln 2
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
~`
n 
(1  sgn (n)) (C + ln (~n))  sgn (n) (n   1)!
(~n)
n
!
: (4.38)
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Figure 4.1: The ergodic secrecy capacity for mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4,
NE = 3, LE = 2, E = 10 dB.
In (4.38), ~`n = `n

mE
E
 n
and ~n = n

mE
E
 1
. We should note that in (4.38),  is
independent of E .
Substituting (4.19) and (4.37) into (4.16), we derive the asymptotic average secrecy
rate as
C1s =log2

B
E

  log2

mB
mE

+
1
ln 2

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~~1   : (4.39)
From (4.39), we see that for a xed ratio of B and E , the average secrecy rate is
a constant value at high SNR. According to (4.24), the high SNR slope S1 is zero.
This new result shows that when the eavesdropper is located close to the transmitter,
increasing the transmit power does not have an impact on the average secrecy rate.
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Figure 4.2: The ergodic secrecy capacity for mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4,
NE = 4, LB = 2, E = 10 dB.
4.4.3 Numerical Results
Figure 4.1 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus B for dierent LB. The exact and
asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity results are obtained from (4.14) and (4.22), respec-
tively. It is shown that the exact curves match precisely with Monte Carlo simulations
and the asymptotic curves well approximate the exact ones in the high SNR regime. The
ergodic secrecy capacity increases when more antennas are selected by Bob. However,
the improvement diminishes with increasing LB.
Figure 4.2 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus B for dierent LE . The ergodic
secrecy capacity decreases when more antennas are selected by Eve. The loss of ergodic
secrecy capacity from selecting one more antenna lessens with increasing LE .
Figure 4.3 depicts the high SNR power oset for dierent scenarios. We can see that
the power oset increases with increasing NE and LE , which decreases the ergodic screcy
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Figure 4.3: The high SNR power oset in decibels, obtaining by either (a)
mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4, NE = N , LB = 2, LE = 4,
E = 10 dB, (b) mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4, NE = N ,
LB = LE = 2, E = 10 dB, (c) mB = mE = 2, NA = 4, NB = N ,
NE = 3, LB = LE = 2, E = 10 dB, (d) mB = mE = 2, NA = 4,
NB = N , NE = 3, LB = 4, LE = 2, E = 10 dB.
capacity. The power oset decreases with increasing NB and LB, which increases the
ergodic secrecy capacity.
Figure 4.4 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus B for dierent LB. Here we
consider the scenario where both Bob and Eve are close to Alice. We set u = BE

dB
= 10
dB3. The exact and asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity are obtained from (4.14) and
(4.39), respectively. The ergodic secrecy capacity increases with increasing LB. In the
high SNR regime, the ergodic secrecy capacity becomes a constant value, which has been
predicted from (4.39).
Figure 4.5 depicts the ergodic secrecy capacity versus B for dierent LE . We set
3Notation: xjdB = 10log10 (x).
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Figure 4.4: The ergodic secrecy capacity for mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4,
NE = 3, LE = 2.
u = 10 dB. The ergodic secrecy capacity decreases with increasing LE . As expected, the
ergodic secrecy capacity is constant in the high SNR regime.
4.5 Secrecy Outage Probability
In this section, we concentrate on passive eavesdropping scenario, where the CSI of the
eavesdropper's channel is not known at Alice. In such a scenario, Alice has no choice
but to encode the condential data into codewords of a constant rate Rs [35], if Rs  Cs
(Cs has been dened in (4.9)), perfect secrecy can be achieved. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs,
information-theoretic security is compromised. In other words, unlike the active eaves-
dropping scenario, perfect secrecy cannot be guaranteed in the passive eavesdropping
scenario, since Alice has no information about the eavesdropper's channel. Motivated by
this, we adopt the secrecy outage probability as a useful performance measure. We derive
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Figure 4.5: The ergodic secrecy capacity for mB = mE = 2, NA = 2, NB = 4,
NE = 4, LB = 2.
new closed-form expressions for the exact and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability.
Based on the asymptotic expressions, we present two key performance indicators, namely
the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain.
4.5.1 Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
A secrecy outage is declared when the secrecy rate Cs is less than the expected secrecy
rate Rs. As such, the secrecy outage probability is derived as
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs) =
Z 1
0
fE (x2)FB
 
2Rs (1+x2)  1

dx2: (4.40)
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Substituting (4.4) and (4.8) into (4.40), and applying the binomial expansion [140, eq.
(1.111)] and [140, eq. (3.351.3)], we obtain
Pout (Rs) =
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k

 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`n
 
LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
!NA
NA!
gX~ X
q=0


q

2Rsq(2Rs   1) qe (2Rs 1)

0B@ n  (q + n)
(2Rs + n)
q+n
  n (q + n)!
(2Rs + n)
q+n+1
1CA: (4.41)
Our new expression for the exact secrecy outage probability in (4.41) applies to arbitrary
numbers of antennas at Bob and Eve, arbitrary fading parameters, and arbitrary average
SNRs in the main and eavesdropper's channels. As shown in [33], the probability of
positive secrecy can be evaluated as 1  Pout (0).
4.5.2 Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we turn our attention to the asymptotic secrecy outage probability.
We consider the following two scenarios.
4.5.2.1 B !1
In this case, Bob is located close to Alice. We substitute (4.6) and (4.8) into (4.40), and
derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as
P1out (Rs) = (GaB)
 Gd + o

 GdB

; (4.42)
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where the secrecy diversity order is
Gd = mBNBNA (4.43)
and the secrecy array gain is
Ga =
2664 LE(mE   1)!

LB
 
NB
LB
NA
(mB)
mBNBNA
  (mB)(mB!)
NB LB (mBNB)!
NA


NE
LE
0@X
SB
ak
 
bk +mB (NB   LB) +mB   1

!
(LB)
bk+mB(NB LB)+mB
1ANA

X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE
`n
mBNBNAX
q=0

mBNBNA
q

 (  (q + n)n   (q + n)!)
2Rsq
 
2Rs   1mBNBNA q
(n)
q+n
3775
  1
mBNBNA
: (4.44)
Based on (4.43) and (4.44), we nd that the secrecy diversity order is entirely determined
by the antenna conguration and the fading parameters in the main channel. The impact
of the eavesdropper's channel is only reected in the secrecy array gain.
In order to characterize the impact of GSC on the secrecy outage probability, we
quantify the secrecy outage tradeo between LB + l and LB, l = 1;    ; NB  LB. From
(4.43), we conrm that LB + l and LB have the same secrecy diversity order. As such,
one can conclude that the SNR gap between LB + l and LB is strictly determined by
their respective secrecy array gains and is expressed as
Ga (LB + l)
Ga (LB)
=
2664(mB!)l (LB + l)
 
NB
LB+l

LB
 
NB
LB

P
S
l
B
a
l
k

b
l
k +mB(NB LB l)+mB 1

!
(LB+l)
b
l
k
+mB(NB LB l)+mBP
SB
ak
(bk+mB(NB LB)+mB 1)!
(LB)
b
k
+mB(NB LB)+mB
3775
  1
mBNB
(4.45)
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where SlB satises the condition
SlB =
(
n
l
k;0;    ; n
l
k;mB 1
mB 1X
i=0
n
l
k;i = LB + l   1
)
:
Corollary 4: For the special case of Rayleigh fading, the secrecy diversity order in (4.43)
reduces to NBNA and the secrecy array gain in (4.44) reduces to
Ga =
"
NE
LE
  
2Rs   1NBNA
(LB!)
NA(LB)
NA(NB LB)
X
SF
E
LEX
n=1
aFk `n

NBNAX
q=0

NBNA
q

2Rs
2Rs   1
q
(  (q + n)n   (q + n)!)
(n)
q+n
#  1
NBNA
: (4.46)
Based on (4.46), we conrm that Ga(LB+1)Ga(LB) > 1. This proves that the secrecy array gain
is an increasing function of LB. It follows that the SNR gap between LB + l and LB in
(4.45) reduces to
Ga (LB + l)
Ga (LB)
=
"
(LB)
lLB!
(LB + l)!

1 + lLB
NB LB l
#  1
NB
: (4.47)
Based on (4.47), we conrm that

Ga(LB+1+l)
Ga(LB+1)
.
Ga(LB+l)
Ga(LB)

< 1. This proves that the
SNR gap is a decreasing function of LB.
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Figure 4.6: The secrecy outage probability for mB = 1, mE = 2, NB = 3,
NE = 3, LE = 2, E = 10 dB.
4.5.2.2 B !1, E !1
In this case, both Bob and Eve are located close to Alice. Based on (4.41), the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability is derived as
P1out (Rs) = limB!1; E!1
Pout (Rs)
=
LE
(mE   1)!

NE
LE
X
SE
mELE+b
F
kX
n=1
ak a
F
k
 ~`n
 
bk + b
F
k +mE   1

!
(LE)
bk+b
F
k +mE

LB
(mB   1)!

NB
LB
NA
NA!
gX~~mBE
mEB
 2Rs
~2Rs
mBE
mEB
+ ~n
+n

 
n  ( + n)  ~n ( + n)!
~2Rs
mBE
mEB
+ ~n
!
: (4.48)
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Figure 4.7: The SNR gap for mB = 2, NB = 10.
For a xed ratio of B and E , (4.48) conrms that the secrecy outage probability
approaches a constant at high SNR, which implies that the secrecy diversity order is
zero. Once again, this result shows that increasing the transmit power does not have an
impact on the secrecy outage probability.
4.5.3 Numerical Results
In this subsection, we provide some numerical results to conrm the aforementioned
analysis. In the simulation, we assume that the expected secrecy rate Rs = 1 bit/s/Hz.
Figure 4.6 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus B for dierent LB and NA.
The exact and asymptotic results are obtained from (4.41) and (4.42), respectively. The
exact curves are in precise agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations, and the asymp-
totic curves accurately predict the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain. As
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Figure 4.8: The secrecy outage probability for mB = 1, mE = 2, NB = 3,
NE = 3, LE = 2.
suggested in (4.43), the secrecy diversity order increases with NA, which decreases the
secrecy outage probability. Increasing LB decreases the secrecy outage probability, due
to the increase of the secrecy array gain.
Figure 4.7 depicts the SNR gap versus LB for dierent l, the results are obtained from
(4.45). When LB is low, the SNR gap is sharp and increases with increasing l antenna
at Bob. However, increasing LB can diminish the gap, which indicates that GSC has an
advantage of balancing the receive performance and implementation complexity.
Figure 4.8 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus B for dierent LB and NA.
We set u = BE

dB
= 10 dB. The exact and asymptotic results are obtained from (4.41)
and (4.48). The secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing LB and NA. As
suggested in (4.48), the secrecy outage probability becomes constant in the high SNR
regime.
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4.6 Conclusions
Transmit antenna selection with generalized selection (TAS/GSC) combining for physical
layer security was examined in MIMO wiretap channels. In doing so, new analytical
expressions of the statistical properties on the SNR with TAS/GSC were derived in
Nakagami-m fading. With the aid of these results, new closed-form expressions for the
exact and the asymptotic average secrecy rate were derived. Using these expressions,
the high SNR slope and the high SNR power oset were precisely characterized. New
closed-form expressions for the exact and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability were
provided, which concisely characterized the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array
gain. Several key observations were drawn based on the locations of the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper relative to the transmitter. It is shown that a capacity
ceiling and an outage oor were created when both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper are close to the transmitter.
Chapter 5
Security in Cognitive Radio
Networks
5.1 Introduction
Security is an important requirement for future 5G systems, and cognitive radio is no
exception. Particularly, security of cognitive radio networks is critical as it is easily
exposed to external threats [8{14]. In [10], security for the main channel was guaranteed
by performing beamforming from a group of relays. In [12], secure communications with
untrusted secondary users in cognitive radio networks was proposed and the achievable
secrecy rate was derived. In [13, 14], game theory was utilized to exploit the security
aspect of cognitive radio networks.
In this chapter, passive eavesdropping is considered, where the channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of the eavesdropper's channel is not available at the secondary transmitter.
In such a cognitive wiretap channel, the secondary transmitter sends condential mes-
sages to the secondary receiver in the presence of a eavesdropper. In this network, the
interference power at the PU from the secondary transmitter must not exceed a peak
interference power threshold. The aim is to address fundamental questions surrounding
77
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nE
Figure 5.1: A cognitive wiretap radio network.
the joint impact of two power constraints on the cognitive wiretap channel: 1) the maxi-
mum transmit power at the secondary transmitter, and 2) the peak interference power at
PU. To address these constraints, new closed-form expressions for the exact and asymp-
totic secrecy outage probability are derived. These analytical results reveal important
design insights into the impact of the primary network on the secondary network in
cognitive wiretap radio networks.
5.2 System and Channel Models
Consider a cognitive wiretap radio network, where the secondary transmitter Alice (A)
communicates with the secondary receiver Bob (B) under the malicious attempt of the
eavesdropper Eve (E) as shown in Figure 5.1. We assume a cognitive network with
underlay spectrum sharing which allows concurrent transmissions from PU and A in
the same spectrum band. For this network, A transmits data to B, where B and E
are equipped with multiple antennas nB and nE, respectively, whereas A and PU are
equipped with a single antenna.
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Both the primary channel and the secondary channel are assumed to undergo inde-
pendent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading, where the channel gains fh1ignBi=1,
fh2jgnEj=1, and h0 are complex Gaussian random variables (RVs) with zero mean and vari-
ances 
1, 
2, and 
0, respectively. We also assume that the main channel from A to B
and the eavesdropper's channel from A to E are independent of each other. We consider
antenna selection1 at B and E2. Here, B and E select their strongest receive antennas
based on perfect CSI estimation via pilot signals transmitted by A. Based on this, the
instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the main and the eavesdropper's channel
are given by
M = max
i=1;:::;nB
PA
N0
jh1ij2; E = max
j=1;:::;nE
PA
N0
jh2j j2; (5.1)
respectively, where PA is the transmit power at A and N0 is the noise variance.
According to underlay cognitive radio transmission, the transmit power at A must be
managed under a peak interference power threshold to guarantee reliable communication
at PU. With this in mind, A is power-limited such that the maximum transmit power is
Pt. As such, the transmit power at A is strictly constrained by the maximum transmit
power Pt at A and the peak interference power Ip at PU according to
PA = min

Ip
jh0j2 ;Pt

; (5.2)
from which the instantaneous SNR at Bob and Eve in (5.1) are reexpressed as
M = min

p
X
; 0

YM ; E = min

p
X
; 0

YE ; (5.3)
respectively, where p = Ip=N0, 0 = Pt=N0, X = jh0j2, YM = max
i=1;:::;nB
jh1ij2, and
YE = max
j=1;:::;nE
jh2j j2.
1It is well-known that using antenna selection can achieve the full diversity gain with a less number
of RF electronics for each branch compared to maximal ratio combining [68].
2In commercial wireless applications, the eavesdropper may be subject to the same resource con-
straints as the legitimate receiver. Specically, it may be limited to a single radio frequency (RF) chain
due to size and complexity limitations, as was considered in [149] and [7].
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5.3 Secrecy Outage Probability
We focus on passive eavesdropping, where knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel is
not known at A. In such a scenario, A has no choice but to encode the condential data
into codewords of a constant rate Rs [35]. Following the wiretap channel in [28, 35], A
encodes a message blockW k into a codeword Xn, and the eavesdropper receives Y nw from
the output of its channel. The equivocation rate of Eve is Re = H
 
W k
Y nw  =n. We
assume slow block fading for the main channel and the eavesdropper's channel, where
the fading coecients are constant during a codeword transmission. Taking this into
account, we dene the secrecy rate as [35]
Cs =
8><>:
CM   CE if M > E
0 if M  E
; (5.4)
where CM = log2 (1 + M) is the capacity of the main channel and CE = log2 (1 + E) is
the capacity of the eavesdropper's channel. The secrecy rate Cs in (5.4) is the maximum
achievable perfect secrecy rate R such that Re = R [28, 35]. In passive eavesdropping,
if Rs  Cs, perfect secrecy is guaranteed. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs, information-theoretic
security is compromised. As such, the secrecy outage probability is the probability that
Cs falls below Rs, which is expressed as
Pout =Pr (Cs < Rs) = Pr (M  E) + Pr (M > E)| {z }
A
Pr (Cs < RsjM > E)| {z }
I
: (5.5)
In order to evaluate the term I, we rst rewrite Cs in (5.4) as
Cs = log2

1 + M
1 + E

< Rs; (5.6)
which is equivalent to
M < 2
Rs (1 + E)  1 = (E): (5.7)
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Then I can be written as
I = 1A
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (E)
E
fMjfX=xg (M) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dMdEdx: (5.8)
where fX (x) is the PDF of X, fAjfX=xg () is the PDF of A conditioned on X, A 2
fM; Eg. By exchanging the variable in the limits of inner integral I, we obtain
I = I1   I2A ; (5.9)
where I1 and I2 are respectively given as
I1 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z (E)
0
fMjfX=xg (M) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dMdEdx (5.10)
and
I2 = 1 A: (5.11)
Putting together (5.5), (5.9), (5.10), and (5.11), we get
Pout =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dEdx: (5.12)
where FMjfX=xg () is the CDF of M conditioned on X.
For ease of exposition and mathematical tractability, we denote 1 = 0
1 =
p
1

and 2=0
2 =
p
2
 with  =
Ip
Pt
. Here, 1 represents the maximum possible average
SNR of the channel between A and B, and 2 represents the maximum possible average
SNR of the channel between A and E.
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Pout =

1  e  
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)i+je 
i(2Rs 1)
1

i2Rs
1
+
j + 1
2
 1
+
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)i+j 1

0

i2Rs
1
+
j + 1
2
 1
e
  

0
  i(2
Rs 1)
1
1

0
+ i(2
Rs 1)
1
;
(5.13)
5.3.1 Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we present a novel closed-form expression for the exact secrecy outage
probability, as given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The exact secrecy outage probability of the proposed cognitive multi-antenna
wiretap channel is given by (5.13),
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
It is worth noting that (5.13) involves only nite summations of exponentials, powers,
and exponential integral functions, thus can be calculated in closed-form. This expression
serves as a prerequisite for other secrecy metrics such as the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity, calculated as Pr (Cs > 0) = Pr (M > E) = 1   Pout (0). In addition,
considering the special case of a single antenna transmitter and a single antenna receiver,
our secrecy outage probability expression without interference power constraint reduces
to [149, eq. (11)]. Our secrecy outage probability expression without interference power
constraint also reduces to [7, eq. 34] with a single transit antenna in Rayleigh fading.
5.3.2 Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
We derive a new asymptotic expression for the secrecy outage probability at high SNR
operating regions. The main driver is to identify the key players that control network
behavior. The aim is to determine the impact of PU on A in the presence of a multi-
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antenna wiretap channel. In particular, we are interested in the joint impact of the
maximum transmit power Pt at A and the peak interference power Ip at PU on the
secrecy outage probability. Other key network players of interest are the number of
antennas nB at B and the number of antennas nE at E. With this in mind, we address
the interference power constraint of Ip proportional to Pt according to Ip = Pt, where
 is a positive constant. Based on Appendix A, we rst obtain the rst order expansion
of FMjfXg () conditioned on X as
FMjfXg () =
8><>:


1
nB
; X  p0
X
1

nB
; X >
p
0
: (5.14)
Substituting (5.14) and fEjfX=xg (E) and fX (x) into (5.12), and using the binomial
expansion, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability is calculated as
P1out =

1  e 
p
0
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i

2Rs   1
1
nB i2Rs
1
i
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)j
Z 1
0
(E)
i e
  (j+1)E
2 dE
+
nBX
i=0

nB
i

2Rs   1
1
nB i 2Rs
1
i nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
2
( 1)j 1

0
Z 1
p
0
e
  x

0
Z 1
0
xnB+1 (E)
i e
  (j+1)E
2
x
dEdx: (5.15)
Employing [140, eq. (3.351.3)] given by
R1
0 x
ne xdx =  (n+1)
n+1
, we can evaluate the
integrals in (5.15) and derive the secrecy outage probability as
P1out = (Ga1)
 Gd +O

 Gd1

; (5.16)
where the secrecy diversity order is
Gd = nB (5.17)
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and the secrecy array gain is
Ga =
"
1  e  
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 
2Rs   1nB i 2Rsi
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE2
i( 1)j   (i+ 1)
(j + 1)i+1
+
nBX
i=0

nB
i

 
2Rs   1nB i  nB2Rsi nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE (2)
i
( 1)j(
0)nB i   (i+ 1)
(j + 1)i+1
 

nB   i+ 1; 

0
#  1nB
; (5.18)
where   (; ) is the incomplete gamma function [140, eq. (8.350.2)].
5.4 Numerical Results
Numerical examples are provided to highlight the impact of the primary network on the
secondary network in the presence of a multi-antenna wiretap channel. The exact and
asymptotic curves are obtained from (5.13) and (5.16), respectively. The exact curves are
in precise agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations. We also see that the asymptotic
curves well approximate the exact curves at high SNR. The asymptotic curves accurately
predict the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain. Throughout this section,
we assume unity variance 
0 = 1 and expected secrecy rate Rs = 0:1 bit/s/Hz.
Figure 5.2 plots the secrecy outage probability versus 1 for dierent  and dierent
nB. According to (5.17), we see that the secrecy diversity order increases with nB, which
in turn decreases the secrecy outage probability. We also see that the secrecy outage
probability decreases with increasing . This is due to relaxing the peak interference
power constraint Ip = Pt, which in turn increases transmit power PA, as indicated
by (5.2). This can also be explained by the fact that the secrecy array gain in (5.18)
increases with increasing .
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Figure 5.2: Secrecy outage probability with 2 = 10 dB and nE = 2.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
 
 
γ   (dB) 1                
P
  
  
o
u
t 
Exact  
Asymptotic  
Simulation, = 2 
 
Simulation, = 6 
 
n
E
n
E
= 15 dB 
 
γ    2     
= 10 dB 
 
γ    2     
= 5 dB 
 
γ    2     
Figure 5.3: Secrecy outage probability with  = 0:1 and nB = 4.
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Figure 5.3 plots the secrecy outage probability versus 1 for dierent 2 and dierent
nE. The parallel slopes of the asymptotes conrm that the secrecy diversity order is
independent of 2 and nE, as indicated in (5.17). Note the secrecy outage probability
increases with increasing 2 and nE. This conrms that the secrecy array gain in (5.18)
is a decreasing function of 2 and nE.
5.5 Conclusions
Physical layer security enhancement in cognitive multi-antenna wiretap channels was
analyzed. In an eort to assess the secrecy performance in passive eavesdropping, the
secrecy outage probability as a useful performance measure was adopted. New closed-
form expressions for the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage probability was derived.
Based on these, important design insights into the interplay between two power con-
straints, namely the maximum transmit power at the secondary network and the peak
interference power at the primary network were concluded. The impact of these con-
straints on the cognitive wiretap channel was showcased.
Chapter 6
Security Enhancement of
Cooperative Single Carrier
Systems
6.1 Introduction
The physical (PHY) layer security issues with secrecy constraints in cyclic prex (CP)
single-carrier (SC) transmission remain unknown. To harness the aforementioned charac-
teristics of multipath components in practice within the framework of PHY layer security,
secure CP-SC transmission in decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks is considered. A
two-stage relay and destination selection is proposed to minimize the eavesdropping and
maximize the signal power of the link between the relay and the destination. Analytical
results for the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy
rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate are derived in closed-form. The secrecy diversity gain
and the secrecy array gain are calculated based on simplied expressions for the secrecy
outage probability in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Likewise, the multi-
plexing gain and the power cost are calculated based on simplied expressions for the
87
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ergodic secrecy rate in the high SNR regime.
Notation: The superscript ()H denotes complex conjugate transposition; IN is an
NN identity matrix; 0 denotes an all-zeros matrix of appropriate dimensions; CN  ; 2
denotes the complex Gaussian distribution with the mean  and the variance 2; Cmn
denotes the vector space of all m  n complex matrices; F'() denotes the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the random variable (RV) '; and Eafg denotes expecta-
tion with respect to a. The probability density function (PDF) of ' is denoted by f'();
[x]+ = max(x; 0) and
iX
l1;:::;la
denotes a set of nonnegative integers fl1; : : : ; lag satisfying
aX
t=1
lt = i.
6.2 System and Channel Model
S
R1
Rk
RK
D1
Dq
DQ
E1
En EN
K relays
Q destinations
N eavesdroppers
k,q
1
k,n
2
Figure 6.1: PHY layer security for cooperative single carrier systems.
In the considered system, which is shown in Figure 6.1, we assume the following set
of instantaneous impulse channel responses.
 A set of channels fgk;q;8k; qg between a particular kth relay and the qth desti-
nation undergo a frequency selective fading. They are assumed to have the same
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N1 multipath components, i.e., g
k;q4=[gk;q1 ; : : : ; g
k;q
N1
]T 2 CN11, each of which is
distributed by the complex white Gaussian distribution with the zero mean and
the unit variance. The path losses over these channels are denoted by fk;q1 ;8k; qg.
 A set of channels fhk;1; : : : ;hk;n; : : : ;hk;Ng between the kth relay and the N eaves-
droppers undergo a frequency selective fading. They are assumed to have the same
N2 multipath components, i.e., h
k;n
4
=[hk;n1 ; : : : ; h
k;n
N2
]T 2 CN21, each of which is distributed by the complex white
Gaussian distribution with the zero mean and the unit variance. The path losses
over these channels are denoted by fk;n2 ;8k; ng.
 The maximum channel length in the considered system is assumed to be Ng =
max(N1; N2; N3), where N3 denotes the multipath channel length between the
source and relays.
For single-carrier cooperative transmission, we assume that
 Binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation is applied such that P modulated
data symbols transmitted by the source form a transmit symbol block x 2 CP1 2
f 1; 1gP satisfying Exfxg = 0 and ExfxxHg = IP .
 To prevent inter-block symbol interference (IBSI) [120, 129, 131], the CP compris-
ing of Pg symbols is appended to the front of x. It is also assume that Pg  Ng.
 We employ the selective-DF relaying protocol, which selects one relay and destina-
tion among their groups. This selection is accomplished via the proposed two-step
selection scheme.
 We assume perfect decoding at each relay, so that error propagation does not exist
in the considered system 1.
1Practically, the source and the relays are located in the same cluster yielding high received SNRs
at the DF relays to successfully decode the messages.
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The signal received at the nth eavesdropper from the kth relay is given by
rk;n =
q
Ps
k;n
2 H
k;nx+ nk;n2 (6.1)
where Ps is the transmit power and H
k;n is the right circulant matrix [129, 150] dened
by hk;n. Also, we assume that nk;n2  CN (0; 2nIP ). Since we assume perfect decoding
at all the relays and perfect knowledge of channel state information (CSI)2, channels
between the source and the relays are not taken into account in (6.1) [43, 151].
Applying the properties of the right circulant channel matrix [129, 150], the instan-
taneous SNR between the kth relay and the nth eavesdropper is dened as
k;n2 =
Ps
k;n
2 khk;nk2
2n
= ~k;n2 khk;nk2  2(2N2; ~k;n2 ) (6.2)
where ~k;n2
4
=
Ps
k;n
2
2n
, and the CDF and PDF of k;n2 are, respectively, given by
F
k;n2
(x) = 1  e x=~k;n2
N2 1X
l=0
1
l!
 
x
~k;n2
!l
U(x) and
f
k;n2
(x) =
1
(~k;n2 )
N2(N2   1)!
xN2 1e x=~
k;n
2 U(x) (6.3)
where U(x) denotes the discrete unit function.
Now the received signal at the qth destination from the kth relay is given by
zk;q =
q
Ps
k;q
1 G
k;qx+ nk;q1 (6.4)
where Gk;q is the right circulant matrix dened by gk;q. Also, we assume that nk;q1 
CN (0; 2nIQ). According to Denition 1, the instantaneous SNR of the link between
the kth relay and the qth destination is given by k;q1 =
Ps
k;q
1 kgk;qk2
2n
= ~k;q1 kgk;qk2 
2This assumption is commonly seen in the prior literature [43, 44]. The CSI of the eavesdropper
channels can be obtained in the scenario where eavesdroppers are active.
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2(2N1; ~
k;q
1 ), so that the CDF of 
k;q
1 is given by
F
k;q1
(x) = 1  e x=~k;q1
N1 1X
l=0
1
l!
 
x
~k;q1
!l
U(x): (6.5)
In the sequel, we assume that pathloss components k;n2 and 
k;q
1 are independent of the
indices of the relay, eavesdropper, and destination, so that we have 2 = fk;n2 ;8k; ng
and 1 = fk;q1 ;8k; qg.
6.3 Relay and Destination Selection under a group of Eaves-
droppers
In this section, we shall rst propose the two-stage relay and destination selection pro-
cedure, in which a relay is selected to minimize the worst-case eavesdropping in the
eavesdropper group, to decrease the amount of information that eavesdroppers wiretap.
And then, the desired destination is selected from the chosen relay to have the maxi-
mum instantaneous SNR between them. That is, the relay and destination are chosen
according to the following selection criterion:
stage1 : k = min argk2[1;K](
k;max
2 ) and
stage2 : q = max argq2[1;Q](
k;q
1 ) (6.6)
where k;max2 denotes the maximum instantaneous SNR among those of between the kth
relay and N eavesdroppers. In addition, k
;q
1 denotes the maximum instantaneous SNR
between the selected relay and the qth destination. When Q = 1, the proposed relay and
destination selection scheme becomes somewhat similar to that of [43] (Note that the
relay selection based on maximal secrecy rate was analyzed in the prior literature such
as [10], which brings large system overhead compared with our proposed scheme.). How-
ever, due to an achievable multiuser diversity, the proposed selection scheme will result
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f
min;max2
(x) =
KN
(~2)N2(N2   1)!
K 1X
k=0
NkX
m=0
N 1X
j=0

K   1
k

Nk
m

N   1
j

( 1)k+m+j
mX
v1;:::;vN2
jX
u1;:::;uN2
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
j!
u1! : : : uN2 !
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)ut+1
e
 x(m+j+1)
~2 xN2+(
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1)+(
PN2 1
t=0 tut+1) 1
= C
gX
e 2xx ~N2 1U(x) (6.8)
where C
4
= KN
(~2)N2 (N2 1)! , 2
4
= (m+j+1)~2 ,
~N2
4
=N2 + (
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1) + (
PN2 1
t=0 tut+1), and
gX4
=
K 1X
k=0
NkX
m=0
N 1X
j=0

K   1
k

Nk
m

N   1
j

( 1)k+m+j
mX
v1;:::;vN2
jX
u1;:::;uN2
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
j!
u1! : : : uN2 !
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)ut+1
: (6.9)
in better secrecy outage probabilities, non-zero achievable secrecy rates, and ergodic
secrecy rates. For this selection, we use a training symbol which has the same statistical
properties as x, and assume a quasi-stationary channel during its operation.
Next, the corresponding CDF and PDF for a link from a particular relay to a group
of eavesdroppers will be derived. We start the derivation for the CDF of k;max2 , which
is given by
F
k;max2
(x) =
"
1  e x=~2
N2 1X
l=0
1
l!
 
x
~2
!l#N
U(x) (6.7)
where we assume that channels between a particular relay and N eavesdroppers are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Since f1;max2 ;    ; K;max2 g is a set of i.i.d. continuous random variables, the PDF of
min;max2
4
=k
;max
2
4
=min(1;max2 ;    ; K;max2 ) can be derived in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For the i.i.d. frequency selective fading channels between a particular relay
and a group of eavesdroppers, the PDF of min;max2 is given by (6.8).
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Proof. A proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix C.1.
For the i.i.d. frequency selective fading channels between a particular relay and a
group of Q destinations, the CDF of k
;q
1
4
=max(k
;1
1 ; :::; 
k;Q
1 ) is given by
F
k
;q
1
(x) =
"
1  e x=~1
N1 1X
l=0
1
l!

x
~1
l#Q
U(x): (6.10)
6.4 Performance Analysis of the Physical Secrecy System
The instantaneous secrecy rate is expressed as [28]
Cs =
1
2
[log2(1 + 
k;q
1 )  log2(1 + min;max2 )]+ (6.11)
where log2(1 + 
k;q
1 ) is the instantaneous capacity of the channel between the cho-
sen relay and the selected destination, whereas log2(1 + 
min;max
2 ) is the instantaneous
capacity of the wiretap channel between the selected relay and the eavesdropper group.
Having obtained PDFs and CDFs of SNRs achieved by the two-stage relay and des-
tination selection scheme, the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero
achievable secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy rate will be derived. Then, an asymp-
totic analysis of the secrecy outage probability will be developed to see the asymptotic
behavior of the system.
6.4.1 Secrecy Outage Probability
According to [152], the secrecy outage probability for a given secure rate, R, is given by
Pout = Pr(Cs < R) =
Z 1
0
F
k
;q
1
(22R(1 + )  1)f
min;max2
()d: (6.12)
A closed-form expression of (6.12) is provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability of the single carrier system employing the
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proposed relay selection scheme in frequency selective fading is given by
Pout = C
gX QX
q=0

Q
q

( 1)qe 
q(JR 1)
~1
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
~L1X
p=0
~L1
p

(JR   1)~L1 p(JR)p
 
qJR
~1
+ 2
! (p+ ~N2)
(p+ ~N2   1)! (6.13)
where JR
4
=22R and ~L1
4
=
PN1 1
t=0 twt+1.
Proof. A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix C.2.
To explicitly see the secrecy diversity gain, we provide an asymptotic expression for
(6.13) in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The asymptotic secrecy outage probability at a xed ~2 is given by
P1out
4
= lim
~1!1
Pout = (Ga~1)
 QN1 +O

(~1)
 QN1

(6.14)
where the secrecy array gain is given by
Ga =
"
C^
(N1!)Q
dXQN1X
l=0

QN1
l

(JR   1)QN1 l(JR)l(~2)l (l +
~N2   1)!
(^)l+ ~N2
#  1
QN1
(6.15)
with C^
4
= KN(N2 1)! , ^
4
=m+ j + 1, and cP, which is given by
dX4
=
K 1X
k=0
NkX
m=0
N 1X
j=0

K   1
k

Nk
m

N   1
j

( 1)k+m+j
mX
v1;:::;vN2
jX
u1;:::;uN2
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
j!
u1! : : : uN2 !
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!)
vt+1
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!)
ut+1
: (6.16)
Proof. A detailed proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix C.3.
This theorem shows that the secrecy diversity gain is QN1, which is the product
of the multipath diversity gain and the multiuser diversity gain achievable between the
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Pr(Cs > 0) = 1  Q
(~1)N1(N1   1)!
KX
k=0
NkX
m=0
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)q+k+m
mX
v1;:::;vN2
 m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
 qX
w1;:::;wN1
 q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
 1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
m
~2
+
q + 1
~1
  ~N1
( ~N1   1)!: (6.18)
selected relay and the Q destinations.
Corollary 1. When ~1 !1; ~2 !1 with ~1~2 = , then the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability is given by
P1out =
C^
(N1!)Q
dX
()QN1(JR)
QN1 (QN1 +
~N2   1)!
(^)QN1+ ~N2
(6.17)
which shows that the secrecy diversity gain is not achievable for this particular case.
6.4.2 The Probability of Non-Zero Achievable Secrecy Rate
In the following, we shall derive the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate.
Corollary 2. The probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate is provided by (6.18).
In (6.18), we have dened ~N1
4
=N1 + (
PN1 1
t=0 twt+1) + (
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1).
Proof. A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix C.4.
To investigate the eect of the diversity gain on the convergence behavior of the prob-
ability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate to Pr(Cs > 0) = 1, we derive an asymptotic
probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate. According to (C.4.3), the probability of
non-zero achievable secrecy rate can be rewritten as
Pr(Cs > 0) = 1 
Z 1
0
F
k
;q
1
(x)f
min;max2
(x)dx: (6.19)
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Substituting (C.3.1) and (6.8) into (6.19), we get the following asymptotic probability
of non-zero achievable secrecy rate
Pr(C1s > 0) = 1 
C
(N1!)
Q

1
~1
N1QgX(N1Q+ ~N2   1)!
(2)
N1Q+ ~N2
(6.20)
which shows that the multipath diversity gain and the multiuser diversity gain simulta-
neously aect the convergence speed of the non-zero achievable secrecy rate to Pr(Cs >
0) = 1. In the following, we shall derive the ergodic secrecy rate for the proposed system.
6.4.3 Ergodic Secrecy Rate
The ergodic secrecy rate is dened as the instantaneous secrecy rate Cs averaged over
j
;q
1 and 
min;max
2 . As such, we formulate the ergodic secrecy rate as
Cs =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Csfk
;q
1
(x1) fmin;max2
(x2)dx1dx2: (6.21)
Substituting (6.11) into (6.21), and applying some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
Cs =
1
2 log(2)
Z 1
0
F
min;max2
(x2)
1 + x2

1  F
k
;q
1
(x2)

dx2: (6.22)
Based on the PDF of min;max2 given in (6.8), the CDF of 
min;max
2 is given by
F
min;max2
(x) =
Z x
0
f
min;max2
(t) dt
= C
gX"( ~N2   1)!
(2)
~N2
  e 2x
~N2 1X
n1=0
( ~N2   1)!
n1!
xn1
(2)
~N2 n1
#
: (6.23)
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Cs =   C
2 log(2)
gX QX
q=1

Q
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
1QN1 1
t=0
 
t!(~1)
twt+1
 ( ~N2) (~L1 + 1)
(2)
~N2
	(~L1 + 1; ~L1 + 1; q=~1) 
~N2 1X
n1=0
 ( ~N2) (~L1 + n1 + 1)
n1!(2)
~N2 n1
	(~L1 + n1 + 1; ~L1 + n1 + 1;2 + q=~1)

: (6.25)
In addition, by employing binomial and multinomial formulas, the CDF of k
;q
1 in (6.10)
can be re-expressed as
F
k
;q
1
(x) = 1 +
QX
q=1

Q
q

( 1)qe qx=~1
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
x
~L1QN1 1
t=0
 
t!(~1)
twt+1 : (6.24)
Substituting (6.23) and (6.24) into (6.22), and using the conuent hypergeometric func-
tion [140, eq. (9.211.4)] given by 	 (; ; z) = 1 ()
R1
0 e
 ztt 1(1 + t)  1dt, we obtain
the ergodic secrecy rate expressed in (6.25).
In order to gather further insight, we present the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate.
We rst consider the case of ~1 !1 and a xed ~2, and provide the following corollary.
Corollary 3. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at ~1 !1 and a xed ~2 is given by
(6.26). In (6.26),  () is the digamma function [153].
Proof. A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix C.5.
With the help of (6.26), we conrm that the multiplexing gain [154] is 1/2 in
bits/sec/Hz/(3 dB), which is given by
S1 = lim
~1!1
C11
log2 (~1)
=
1
2
: (6.27)
It is indicated from (6.27) that under these circumstances, secure communication achieves
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C11 =
1
2
log2(~1) +
1
2 log(2)
h Q
(N1   1)!
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
(
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
)
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
 (N1 + ~L1)
(q + 1)N1+~L1
[ (N1 + ~L1)  log(q + 1)] +
KX
k=1
NkX
m=1

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)k+m+1
mX
v1;:::;vN2
(
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
)
 (
N2 1P
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)
vt+1	(
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m=~2)
i
:
(6.26)
the same spectral eciency as communication without eavesdropping. Moreover, using
(6.26), we can easily calculate the additional power cost for dierent network parameters
while maintaining a specied target ergodic secrecy rate. For example, we consider
dierent numbers of relays K1 and K2 with K1 > K2. Compared to the K1 case, the
additional power cost in achieving the specied target ergodic secrecy rate in the K2
scenario is calculated as
P (dB) =
10
log 10
[(K1)  (K2)] (6.28)
where
(K) =
KX
k=1
NkX
m=1

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)k+m+1
mX
v1;:::;vN2
(
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
)
 (
N2 1P
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)
vt+1	(
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m=~2):
Similarly, the additional power cost in achieving the specied target ergodic secrecy rate
under dierent numbers of destinations or eavesdroppers can be accordingly obtained.
We next consider the case of ~1 ! 1 and ~2 ! 1 with ~1~2 = , and provide the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. The asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at ~1 !1 and ~2 !1 with ~1~2 = 
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C12 =
1
2
log2() +
1
2 log (2)
h Q
(N1   1)!
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
(
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
)
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
 (N1 + ~L1)
(q + 1)N1+~L1
[ (N1 + ~L1)  log(q + 1)]  C^dX ( ~N2)
(^) ~N2
[ ( ~N2)  log(^)]
i
: (6.29)
is given by (6.29).
Proof. A proof of this corollary is provided in Appendix C.6.
It is indicated from (6.29) that a capacity ceiling exists in this case.
6.4.4 The Eects of Multiple Antennas at the Eavesdroppers
We shall investigate the eect of multiple antennas at the eavesdroppers. Using MRC
at each eavesdropper, the received signal expressed in (1) becomes
rk;n =
q
Ps
k;n
2
MX
r=1
( ~Hk;nr )
HHk;nr x+
MX
r=1
( ~Hk;nr )
Hnk;n1 (6.30)
where Hk;nr is the right circulant matrix formed for a link from the kth relay to the rth
receive antenna branch at the nth eavesdropper. In the formulation of (6.30), we assume
M antennas at the each eavesdropper, and k;n2 is independent of the antenna branches.
In addition, ~Hk;nr is the receive matrix for the rth receive antenna branch at the nth
eavesdropper. The maximum instantaneous post-processing SNR due to MRC, which is
imposes ~Hk;nr =H
k;n
r , becomes [135]
k;n;eMRC2 =
Ps
k;n
2
PM
r=1 khk;nr k2
2n
: (6.31)
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P eMRCout = C
eMRCgXeMRC QX
q=0

Q
q

( 1)qe 
q(JR 1)
~1
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
~L1X
p=0
~L1
p

(JR   1)~L1 p(JR)p
 qJR
~1
+ 2
 (p+ ~NeMRC2 )(p+ ~N eMRC2   1)!;
P r(CeMRCs > 0) = 1 
Q
(~1)N1(N1   1)!
KX
k=0
NkX
m=0
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)q+k+m
mX
v1;:::;vMN2
  m!
v1! : : : vMN2 !
 qX
w1;:::;wN1
  q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
 1QMN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
 m
~2
+
q + 1
~1
  ~N1( ~N1   1)!; and
CeMRCs =  
1
2 log(2)
CeMRC
gXeMRC QX
q=1

Q
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
1QN1 1
t=0
 
t!(~1)
twt+1
h ( ~N eMRC2 ) (~L1 + 1)
(2)
~NeMRC2
	(~L1 + 1; ~L1 + 1; q=~1) 
~NeMRC2  1X
n1=0
 ( ~N eMRC2 ) (
~L1 + n1 + 1)
n1!(2)
~NeMRC2  n1
	(~L1 + n1 + 1; ~L1 + n1 + 1;2 + q=~1)
i
: (6.33)
Comparing to the expression in (6.2), we can easily see that
k;n;eMRC2 = ~
k;n
2
MX
r=1
khk;nr k2  2(2N2M; ~k;n2 ): (6.32)
Using the statistical properties of k;n;eMRC2 , the performance metrics, such as the secrecy
outage probability, the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate, and the ergodic
secrecy rate can be derived. Their corresponding expressions are given by (6.33) at the
bottom of the previous page. In (6.33), we have dened CeMRC
4
=C

N2!MN2
,
fPeMRC4=fP
N2!MN2
, and ~N eMRC2
4
=MN2 + (
PMN2 1
t=0 tvt+1) + (
PMN2 1
t=0 tut+1).
Corollary 5. The multiple antennas employed in the form of MRC at each eavesdropper
do not inuence the secrecy diversity gain. They can only change the secrecy array gain.
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Proof. According to Theorem 2, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at a xed ~2
is given by
P1;eMRCout = (G
eMRC
a ~1)
 QN1 +O((~1) QN1) (6.34)
where
GeMRCa =
"
C^eMRC
(N1!)Q
dXeMRC QN1X
l=0

QN1
l

(JR   1)QN1 l
(JR)
l(~2)
l (l +
~N eMRC2   1)!
(^)l+
~NeMRC2
#  1
QN1
(6.35)
with C^eMRC
4
=C^

N2!MN2
and cPeMRC4=cP
N2!MN2
, where C^ and cP are specied in
(6.16). From (6.34), we can readily see that MRC at the each eavesdropper does not
aect the secrecy diversity gain.
Corollary 6. The multiple antennas employed in the form of MRC at the eavesdroppers
do not inuence the multiplexing gain. They can only change the additional power cost
for a specied target ergodic secrecy rate.
Proof. According to Corollary 3, the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate at a xed ~2 is
given by only interchanging the parameter N2 ! MN2. From (6.27), we see that the
multiplexing gain is still 1/2, and MRC at the eavesdroppers impacts the additional
power cost as shown in (6.28).
6.5 Simulation Results
For the simulations, we use BPSK modulation. The transmission block size is formed by
64 BPSK symbols. The CP length is given by 16 BPSK symbols. Every channel vectors
are generated by hk;n  CN(0; IN2);8k; n and gk;q  CN(0; IN1);8k; q. The curves
obtained via actual link simulations are denoted by Ex, whereas analytically derived
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curves are denoted by An. Asymptotically obtained curves are denoted by As in the
following gures.
6.5.1 Secrecy Outage Probability
Figures 6.2-6.4 show the secrecy outage probability for various scenarios. Figure 6.2
shows the secrecy outage probability for various values of N1 at xed values of (K =
4; N = 2; N2 = 3; Q = 1;M = 1; R = 1) and ~2 = 5 dB. As Theorem 2 proves, a
lower secrecy outage probability is achieved by a bigger value of N1. In this particular
scenario, the secrecy diversity gain becomes N1. We can see exact matches between the
analytically derived curves and the simulation obtained curves for the outage probability.
Figure 6.3 shows the secrecy outage probability for various values of Q and M at
xed value of (K = 4; N = 2; N1 = 3; N2 = 2; R = 1) and ~2 = 5 dB. We can observe the
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Figure 6.2: Secrecy outage probability for various values of N1 at xed values
of (N2 = 3; R = 1) and ~2 = 5 dB.
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Figure 6.3: Secrecy outage probability for various values of Q and M at xed
values of (N1 = 3; N2 = 2; R = 1) and ~2 = 5 dB.
eect of the multiuser diversity gain on the secrecy outage probability. As Q increases,
a lower secrecy outage probability is obtained due to the multiuser diversity. We can
also observe the eect of multiple antennas at the eavesdroppers. For the same channel
length and the number of destinations, for example, (N1 = 3; N2 = 2; Q = 1;M = 1)
has a 3 dB gain over (N1 = 3; N2 = 2; Q = 1;M = 2) at 1  10 3 outage probability.
Similar behavior can be observed as M becomes larger. Moreover, it can be seen that
N , the number of eavesdroppers, does not change the secrecy diversity gain.
Figure 6.4 veries the derived asymptotic secrecy outage probability at a xed ~2.
As ~1 increases, the asymptotic curves approaches the simulation obtained curves for
various values of N1, Q, andM . From these curves, we can see that the secrecy diversity
gain is N1Q, which is determined by the multipath diversity gain, N1, and the multiuser
diversity gain, Q. It is irrespective of M . A similar overall diversity gain is obtained in
[129], which does not consider eavesdroppers.
Chapter 6. Security Enhancement of Cooperative Single Carrier Systems 104
10 15 20 25 30
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
α˜1 [dB]
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Ex : N1 = 2, Q = 1, M = 1
As : N1 = 2, Q = 1, M = 1
Ex : N1 = 2, Q = 2, M = 1
As : N1 = 2, Q = 2, M = 1
Ex : N1 = 3, Q = 3, M = 1
As : N1 = 3, Q = 3, M = 1
Ex : N1 = 3, Q = 2, M = 2
As : N1 = 3, Q = 2, M = 2
Figure 6.4: Asymptotic secrecy outage probability for various values of N1, Q,
and M at xed values of (N2 = 3; R = 1) and ~2 = 5 dB.
6.5.2 The Probability of Non-Zero Achievable Secrecy Rate
Figure 6.5 illustrates the probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate for various values
of N1, M , and Q. At xed (K = 4; N = 2) and ~2 = 5 dB, this gure shows that (N1 =
2;M = 2; Q = 1) has the slowest convergence speed arriving at Pr(Cmin > 0) = 0:999
due to the smallest achievable diversity gain and the value ofM . Although (N1 = 2;M =
2; Q = 1) has the same diversity gain as (N1 = 2;M = 1; Q = 1), its convergence speed
is slowest due to greater eavesdropping capability of eavesdroppers. If we compare two
particular scenarios, such as (N1 = 2;M = 2; Q = 1) and (N1 = 3;M = 2; Q = 1), then
the multipath diversity is seen to be one of the key factor in determining the convergence
speed, whereas by comparing (N1 = 2;M = 2; Q = 1) with (N1 = 2;M = 2; Q = 2), we
can see that the multiuser diversity is another key factor in determining the convergence
speed of the non-zero achievable secrecy rate.
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Figure 6.5: The Probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate for various
values of N1, M , and Q at xed values of N2 = 2 and ~2 = 5 dB.
6.5.3 The Ergodic Secrecy Rate
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Figure 6.6: Ergodic secrecy rate for various values of (K;N1; N2;M;Q).
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In Figure 6.6, we rst compare the derived ergodic secrecy rate with the simulation
obtained ergodic secrecy rate for the case of (N1 = 3; N2 = 2;M = 1; Q = 4). We assume
a xed number of eavesdroppers (N = 3) and a single relay (K = 1). Perfect matchings
between them can be observed. From this gure, we can compare several scenarios to
investigate the eects from the system congurations and channels.
 The eect of eavesdropping: More eavesdropping reduces the ergodic secrecy rate.
For example, (N1 = 3; N2 = 2;M = 2; Q = 4) vs. (N1 = 3; N2 = 2;M = 1; Q = 4).
 The eect of multipath diversity which is achievable between the relay and the
destination: Higher multipath diversity gain results in a higher ergodic secrecy rate.
For example, (N1 = 3; N2 = 2;M = 2; Q = 2) vs. (N1 = 2; N2 = 2;M = 2; Q = 2).
 The eect of number of destinations: With more destinations, a higher ergodic
secrecy rate can be obtained due to a larger multiuser diversity gain. For example,
(N1 = 2; N2 = 2;M = 2; Q = 4) vs. (N1 = 2; N2 = 2;M = 2; Q = 2).
 The eect of xed ~2: As Corollary 4 veried, capacity ceilings are intrinsic for
this case.
In Figure 6.7, we show the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate for various values of
(K;N1; N2;M;Q) at a xed number of eavesdroppers N = 3 and ~2. This plot shows
the corresponding asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate obtained from Corollary 3. As ~1
increases, the dierences between the analytical ergodic secrecy rates and the asymptotic
ergodic secrecy rates are negligible. We can also easily see that the multipath diversity
and the multiuser diversity are two key factors in determining the ergodic secrecy rates.
According to (6.28), a total of ve relays can reduce 0.8 dB power than a single relay in
achieving 2.0 secrecy rate.
Figure 6.8 shows the multiplexing gain S1 as a function of (K;N1; Q), which are the
key system and channel parameters in determining the diversity gain. As ~1 increases,
the multiplexing gain S1 approaches 1/2. Since a larger diversity has a more inuence
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Figure 6.7: Ergodic secrecy rate for various values of N1 and Q at xed values
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from the second term in the right hand side of (6.26), the convergence speed to 1/2
becomes slower as the diversity gain increases.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, cooperative single carrier systems with multiple relays and destinations
was investigated. A coexisting group of eavesdroppers have been assumed to eavesdrop
the relays. For this challenging environment, we have proposed a two-stage relay and des-
tination selection scheme: 1) relay is selected to minimize the worst-case eavesdropping,
and 2) the desired destination is selected to achieve the multiuser diversity gain. We have
derived the secrecy outage probability, the non-zero secrecy rate, and the ergodic secrecy
rate. From the derivations and the link simulations, the diversity gain has been shown to
be determined by the multipath diversity gain and the multiuser diversity gain. Having
derived the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate, the multiplexing gain has been shown to be
equal to the number of hops.
Chapter 7
Secure Transmission with
Optimal Power Allocation in
Untrusted Relay Networks
7.1 Introduction
Security in untrusted relay networks has been paid considerable attention in the recent
literature. For example, cooperative jamming (CJ) was proposed to achieve positive
secrecy rate in [101, 105]. Secrecy outage performance for dierent relaying schemes was
examined in [155]. The impact of relay antenna selection on secrecy outage probability
was analyzed in [53]. The lower bound of the ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) without
optimal power allocation (OPA) was derived in [51], where single-relay and multiple-relay
cases were considered.
Dierent from the aforementioned works, CJ with OPA is employed for securing
the transmission in two-hop amplify-and-forward (AF) untrusted relay networks in this
chapter. The asymptotic analysis for large number of antennas is also presented.
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7.2 Mathematical Model
The implementation of CJ is considered in a half-duplex two-hop relay network consisting
of a source (Alice) and a destination (Bob) communicating via an untrusted AF relay.
During the rst phase, while Alice transmits the information signal1, Bob transmits
the jamming signal, and the direct link between Alice and Bob is assumed to be non-
existent2. During the second phase, the relay forwards the signals to Bob. The purpose
is to quantify the impact of OPA in securing the transmission for two practical networks:
1) Alice is equipped with Na antennas, whereas both the relay and Bob are equipped with
a single antenna (Na 1 1), and 2) Bob is equipped with Nb antennas, whereas both the
relay and Alice are equipped with a single antenna (1 1 Nb). For the Na 1 1 network,
Alice uses the maximum-ratio transmission (MRT) beamformer to transmit the signal.
For the 1 1 Nb network, Bob uses the MRT beamformer to transmit the jamming signal
and maximum-ratio combining (MRC) to maximize the received SNR. This transceiver
design at Bob can be easily achieved, particularly in reciprocal channels [51, 53]. We
note that the MRT beamformer has low implementation complexity compared to other
more complex beamforming designs [50]. Let ha;rCN 1Na (01Na ;
a;rINa) denote the
complex Gaussian channel vector from Alice to relay and hr;bCN 1Nb (01Nb ;
r;bINb)
denote the channel vector from relay to Bob. We assume a reciprocal channel between
the relay and Bob [51, 53].
The instantaneous received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the relay
is given by
R =
a;r
(1  ) r;b +  (7.1)
1Note that Alice knows the channel knowledge of the two hops, in order to determine the length of
codeword.
2In fact, since the destination operates in half-duplex mode, it cannot receive the transmitted signal
from the source while transmitting the jamming signal.
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and the instantaneous end-to-end SNR at Bob is given by
B =
a;rr;b
a;r + (2  ) r;b + ; (7.2)
where  is the power allocation factor,  2 (0; 1]. Alice transmits the signal with
power P and Bob transmits the jamming signal with power (1  )P , where P is the
total power budget in this network for each transmission. Also a;r = kha;rk20 and
r;b = khr;bk20, where 0 = PN0 is the transmit SNR of this network. In (7.1) and (7.2),
we note that  = 1 accounts for the noise variance at the relay and  = 0 does not
account for the noise variance at the relay.
7.3 Optimal Power Allocation
The instantaneous secrecy rate is expressed as
Cs =
1
2
[log2 (1 + B)  log2 (1 + R)]+; (7.3)
where [x]+=max f0; xg.
In order to facilitate analysis and gather deep insights behind this system, we consider
 = 0, as mentioned in [156]. Note that the  = 0 case asymptotically approaches the
 = 1 case at high SNRs. The  = 0 case also takes into account the maximum
probability of eavesdropping at the relay, since the received SINR at the relay given in
(7.1) becomes the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)3. As such, let
a;r
r;b
= , we rewrite
(7.1) and (7.2) as
r =

(1  ) and b =
r;b
+ 2  : (7.4)
Our aim is to maximize the secrecy rate. Hence, we focus on optimal power allocation
3In a practical scenario, the noise power at the untrusted relay may not be available or accurately
estimated, in this case the noise power at the relay is ignored.
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(OPA). Based on (7.3) and (7.4), the OPA factor is calculated as
=argmax

f! ()g ; (7.5)
where ! () = 1+b1+r . Noting that
@2!()
@2
< 0, we take the derivative of ! () w.r.t. 
and set it to zero to obtain the OPA factor as
 =
8><>:
0:5  1r;b ;  = 1
2 2 2r;b+
p
2r;b
p

( 1)2+( 2)r;b+2r;b ;  6= 1;
(7.6)
where  = 1 2+r;b+2r;b. For large r;b4, based on (7.6), when  = 1,   1=2,
and when  6= 1,  can be approximated as
 =
2 2
r;b
  2 +p2
q
1 2
r;b
+ + 2
(  1)2=r;b + (  2) + 2
 2 +
p
2
p
+ 2
(  2) + 2 =
 1+p(+2) =2
(+2) =2  1
=
1p
(+2) =2 + 1
: (7.7)
Since  = 1 case also satises  = 1p
(+2)=2+1
= 12 , for arbitrary , 
 is approximated
as
=
1p
(+ 2) =2 + 1
: (7.8)
In an eort to assess the secrecy performance, we proceed to derive the ESC with OPA
and present fundamental design insights as the number of antennas grows large.
4From (7.4), we note that increasing r;b increases the end-to-end SNR at Bob and decreases the
received SINR at the untrusted relay. Therefore, a larger r;b will improve the secrecy performance. We
also note that r;b = khr;bk20, as such r;b increases with either the transmit power or the number of
antennas at Bob.
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Cs =
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0

ln

1 +
x2
+ 2  

  ln

1 +

(1  )

 x2fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2: (7.11)
7.4 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
The ESC describes the maximum of the average achievable secrecy rate, which is formu-
lated as [35]
Cs = E fCsg =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Csfa;r (x1) fr;b (x2)dx1dx2; (7.9)
where E fxg is the expectation of x, fa;r (x1) is the probability density function (PDF)
of a;r, and fr;b (x2) is the PDF of r;b. Using the integration by substitution [140, eq.
(4.601.1)], the ESC in (7.9) is re-expressed as
Cs =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Csx2fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2)ddx2: (7.10)
Substituting (7.3) and (7.4) into (7.10), we obtain the ESC with OPA given in (7.11).
Note that (7.11) is the asymptotic ESC expression at high SNRs when the noise variance
at the relay is used ( = 1). From (7.6) and (7.11), we nd that it is intractable to
further simplify the ESC expression in (7.11). To gain more insights, we derive new
compact expressions for the ESC at high SNRs. We also quantify the impact of large
scale antennas on the ESC for the Na 1 1 and 1 1 Nb networks.
7.4.1 Na 1 1
In this network, Alice is equipped with Na antennas and uses the MRT beamformer to
transmit the signal.
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7.4.1.1 High SNR Analysis
We obtain a simple yet accurate expression for the asymptotic ESC as
Casys =
1
2 ln 2
"
ln a;r +  (Na) Na a;r
r;b
Z 1
0
' ()Na 1

+
a;r
r;b
 (Na+1)
d
#
; (7.12)
where a;r = 
a;r0, r;b = 
r;b0,  (Na) =  C +
Na 1P
n=1
1
n with Euler's constant C [140,
eq. (8.365)], and ' () = ln

1 + 3+ 2
p
2 (+ 2)

. A detailed derivation of (7.12)
is provided in Appendix D.1. From (7.12), we nd that ESC is an increasing function
of the transmit SNR 0. Moreover, using (7.12), we can easily calculate and compare
the transmit power costs for dierent network parameters, while maintaining a specied
target ESC.
7.4.1.2 Large Na Analysis
By substituting (7.8) into (7.4), we obtain
r =
1p
( 1 + 1) =2
; b =
r;b
1 +
p
2 (1 + 1=) + 1=
: (7.13)
For large Na,  =
a;r
r;b
=
kha;rk2
khr;bk2  1, and hence 1=  0. Therefore, (7.13) reduces to
r =
p
2 and b =
r;b
1 +
p
2
: (7.14)
Based on (7.14), we have
Cs =
1
2
E

log2

1 +
r;b
1 +
p
2

  log2

1 +
p
2

=
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
1  Fr;b (x)
1 +
p
2 + x
dx  1
2
log2

1 +
p
2

=   e
#
2 ln 2
Ei ( #)  1
2
log2

1 +
p
2

; (7.15)
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where Fr;b (x) = 1  e x=r;b is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of r;b, # = 
1 +
p
2

=r;b =
 
1 +
p
2

= (
r;b0), and Ei (x) is the exponential integral function [140,
eq. (8.211.1)]. As indicated by (7.15), the ESC is entirely determined by the average
channel gain of the second hop and the transmit SNR of the network. We also nd that
increasing the number of antennas at Alice has no impact on the ESC when Na is large.
7.4.2 1  1 Nb
In this network, Bob is equipped with Nb antennas and uses the MRT beamformer to
transmit the jamming signal to confound the untrusted relay. Upon receiving the signal
from the relay, Bob rst cancels the jamming signal, then uses MRC to maximize the
received SNR.
7.4.2.1 High SNR Analysis
We derive a compact expression for the asymptotic ESC as
Casys =
1
2 ln 2
"
(ln a;r   C)  r;bNb
a;r
Z 1
0
' ()

r;b
a;r
+ 1
 (Nb+1)
d
#
: (7.16)
7.4.2.2 Large Nb Analysis
Recall that  =
kha;rk2
khr;bk2 . For large Nb,  1. Based on (7.13) and (??), we obtain
r =
p
2p
1 + 

p
2 and (7.17)
b =
r;b
+
p
2 (2 + ) + 1
 r;b = a;r: (7.18)
Chapter 7. Secure Transmission with Optimal Power Allocation in Untrusted Relay
Networks 116
As such, we have
Cs =
1
2
E
n
log2 (1 + a;r)  log2

1 +
p
2
o
=
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + x) fa;r (x) dx 
1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln

1 +
p
2

fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2)ddx2
=  e
1=a;r
2 ln 2
Ei ( 1=a;r)  1
2 ln 2
Z 1
0

r;bt
2
2a;r
+ 1
 Nb
(1 + t) 1dt: (7.19)
From (7.19), we see that the ESC increases with increasing number of antennas at Bob.
For very large antennas, i.e., Nb !1, r  0, (7.19) reduces to
Cs =  e
1=a;r
2 ln 2
Ei ( 1=a;r) : (7.20)
It is indicated by (7.20) that ESC only depends on the average channel gain of the rst
hop and the transmit SNR of the network when Nb is very large.
7.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we present numerical examples for the ESC with OPA to illustrate the
Na 1 1 and 1 1 Nb networks. We assume that 
a;r = 
r;b = 1. In our examples,
`o' are Monte Carlo simulations with OPA factor given by (7.6) and `+' are Monte
Carlo simulations with approximate OPA factor given by (7.8). The solid and dash
lines represent the large system analysis and high SNR approximation, respectively. For
comparison, we set  = 0:5 for equal power allocation (EPA).
Figure 7.1 shows ESC versus 0 for Na 1 1. Compared with EPA, OPA can achieve
perfect secrecy with some positive secrecy rate, even at low SNRs. The simplied OPA
factor in (7.8) can well match those obtained from the exact calculation in (7.6). The
asymptotic curves obtained from (7.12) well approximate the Monte Carlo simulations
in the high SNR regime. Moreover, our large system analysis in (7.15) well assess the
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Figure 7.1: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus 0 for Na   1  1.
secrecy performance limit with large antennas. It is interesting to note that under OPA,
increasing antennas improve the ESC, this however is not the case for EPA. Under EPA,
ESC decreases with increasing antennas. This is due to the fact that increasing Na helps
the untrusted relay to increase the probability of successful eavesdropping. In such a
scenario, more power should be allocated to the jamming signal.
Figure 7.2 shows ESC versus 0 for 1   1   Nb. The simplied OPA factor in (7.8)
well approximates the exact OPA factor in (7.6). The asymptotic curves obtained from
(7.16) are in precise agreement with Monte Carlo simulations in the high SNR regime.
The theoretical result in (7.19) tightly predicts the ESC with large Nb. As expected
from (7.19), the ESC increases with Nb. We also see that the ESC with EPA increases
with increasing antennas. The reason is that strengthening the jamming signal reduces
the eavesdropping.
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Figure 7.2: Ergodic secrecy capacity versus 0 for 1  1 Nb.
7.6 Conclusions
Cooperative jamming with optimal power allocation was examined in the two-hop untrusted
relay network. The ergodic secrecy capacity was derived. Some interesting conclusions
are drawn from our large system analysis as Na ! 1 and Nb ! 1. For large Na, it
is shown that the ergodic secrecy capacity only depends on the average channel gain of
the second hop and the transmit SNR. For very large Nb, the ergodic secrecy capacity
only depends on the average channel gain of the rst hop and the transmit SNR.
Chapter 8
A Stochastic Geometry Approach
for Physical Layer Security in
Three-Tier Wireless Sensor
Networks
8.1 Introduction
The potential of using physical layer security in three-tier wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) is investigated in this chapter. In three-tier WSNs, the sensors are located
far from the sinks, and the relays are deployed to help the sensors forward their data to
the sinks. Condential information transmissions are intercepted by the eavesdroppers.
Considering the fact that sensors are densely deployed and their locations are randomly
distributed [70], stochastic geometry is implemented to model the locations of the nodes
in WSNs. Such a modeling approach has been applied in heterogeneous networks [85]
and cognitive radio networks [88].
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Sensing eld Relays Sinks
Eavesdropper
Sensor
 Relay Sink
Figure 8.1: The illustration of three-tier wireless sensor networks, where the
sensors transmit the sensed data to the sinks via the relays, in the
presence of eavesdropping.
8.2 System Description
As shown in Figure 8.1, a three-tier wireless sensor networks is considered, where the
geographically remote sensors transmit the sensed data to the sinks with the help of
half-duplex decode-and-forward (DF) relays with no direct links between sensors and
sinks. The eavesdroppers overhears the data transmission without modifying it. In
the sensing eld, sensors are randomly located according to a homogeneous Poisson
point process (HPPP) s;a with intensity s. The relays and sinks are randomly located
according to independent HPPPs ap;a and sk with intensities ap and sk, respectively.
Since the sensors may transmit data intermittently, the activity probability of sensor
that is triggered to transmit the data is denoted as s (0 < s < 1), and the activity
probability of relay that forwards the data to the sink is denoted as ap (0 < ap < 1).
Non-colluding eavesdroppers are considered and eavesdroppers' locations are modeled as
two independent HPPPs s;e and ap;e with intensities 
s
e and 
ap
e , respectively. The
eavesdroppers in s;e intercept the data transmitted by the sensors and the eavesdroppers
in ap;e intercept the data transmitted by the relays. Note that the eavesdroppers in
s;e and in ap;e are far from each other.
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In this three-tier network, the sensor is associated with its nearest relay and the relay
is associated with its nearest sink. Each relay is equipped with M antennas, and the
sensors and sinks are single-antenna nodes. To enhance the information transmission,
the relays use maximal-ratio combining (MRC) to receive the sensors' data signals and
maximal-ratio transmission (MRT) beamformer to transmit the signals. The wireless
channels are modeled as independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading. For an arbitrary
typical sensor o, the receive signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) after MRC at
its corresponding typical relay is given by
ap =
khs0;ap0k2jXs0;ap0 j 
Is;ap + Iap;ap| {z }
Inap
+2

Ps
; (8.1)
where Is;ap =
P
i2s;anfs0g
 hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0khi;ap0
2jXi;ap0 j , Iap;ap = Pj2ap;anfap0g hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0kHj;ap0 hj;skj yhj;skj

2
jXj;ap0 j ,  = Pap/Ps, y is the conjugate transpose. Here, s;a
and ap;a are the locations of active sensors and active relays, hs0;ap0 and jXs0;ap0 j are
the channel fading vector and distance between the typical sensor and its typical relay,
respectively,  is the path loss exponent, hi;ap0 2 CM1 and jXi;ap0 j are the channel fading
vector and distance between the sensor i and the typical relay, respectively, Hj;ap0 and
jXj;ap0 j are the channel fading matrix and distance between the relay j and the typical
relay, respectively, hj;skj 2 C1M is the channel fading vector between the relay j and its
corresponding sink, Ps is the sensor's transmit power, Pap is the relay's transmit power,
and 2 is the noise power.
We consider the non-colluding eavesdropping scenario, in which the most detrimental
eavesdropper that has the highest receive SINR dominates the secrecy rate [44]. Thus,
the received SINR at the most detrimental eavesdropper in se for the sensor and the
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relay transmission is given by
s;e = max
ek2s;e
8>>><>>>:
jhs0;ek j2jXs0;ek j 
Is;e + Iap;e| {z }
Ins;e
+2

Ps
9>>>=>>>; ; (8.2)
where Is;e =
P
i2s;anfs0gjhi;ek j2jXi;ek j  and Iap;e =
P
j2ap;anfap0g
hj;ek hj;skj yhj;skj

2
jXj;ek j ,
hs0;ek and jXs0;ek j are the channel fading coecient and distance between the typical sen-
sor and the eavesdropper, respectively, hi;ek and jXi;ek j are the channel fading coecient
and distance between sensor i and the eavesdropper, respectively, and hj;ek and jXj;ek j
are the channel fading vector and distance between the relay j and the eavesdropper,
respectively.
After receiving the sensors' data, relays will forward them to the nearest sinks for
data collection. In this scenario, we select an arbitrary relay as a typical node ap0, and
the received SINR at the typical sink sk0 is given by
sk =
kgap0;sk0k2jXap0;sk0 j 
Inap;sk + 2

Pap
; (8.3)
where Inap;sk =
P
j2ap;anfap0g
gj;sk0 hj;skj yhj;skj

2
jXj;sk0 j  , gap0;sk0 2 C1M and jXap0;sk0 j
are the channel fading vector and distance between the typical relay and its typical sink,
respectively,  is the path loss exponent, gj;sk0 2 C1M and jXj;sk0 j are the channel
fading vector and distance between the relay j and the typical sink, and hj;skj 2 C1M
is the channel fading vector between the relay j and its associated sink. In this case,
the received SINR at the most detrimental eavesdropper for the relay and the sink
transmission is given by
ap;e = max
ek2ap;e
8>><>>:
gap0;ek gap0;sk0ykgap0;sk0k
2jXap0;ek j 
Inap;e + 2

Pap
9>>=>>;; (8.4)
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where Inap;e =
P
j2ap;anfap0g
gj;ek hj;skk ykhj;skkk
2jXj;ek j  , gap0;ek and jXap0;ek j are the chan-
nel fading coecient and distance between the typical relay and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, and gj;ek and jXj;ek j are the channel fading vector and distance between the relay
j and the eavesdropper, respectively.
8.3 Secrecy Performance Evaluations
In this section, we characterize the secrecy performance in terms of average secrecy
rate and secrecy outage probability. Before exhibiting the overall secrecy performance
behaviors, we evaluate the secrecy of the two dierent links, namely the link between
the sensor and relay, and the link between the relay and sink, respectively. In doing
so, we derive new analytical expressions for the average secrecy rate and secrecy outage
probability, and analyze the impact of these two links on the overall secrecy performance.
8.3.1 Average Secrecy Rate between the Sensor and the relay
We evaluate the average secrecy rate based on the worst-case, i.e., the average secrecy
rate is dominated by the eavesdropper with the best channel [44]. Hence, for a typical
link between a typical sensor and its associated relay, the instantaneous secrecy rate is
dened as [146]
Caps = [Cap   Cs;e]+; (8.5)
where [x]+ = maxfx; 0g, Cap = log2 (1 + ap) is the capacity of the channel between the
typical sensor and relay, and Cs;e = log2 (1 + s;e) is the capacity of the eavesdropping
channel between the typical sensor and the most detrimental eavesdropper.
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(8.6)
where
mX
l=1
l ml = m:
8.3.1.1 New Statistics
We rst derive the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of SINRs at the typical
relay and the most detrimental eavesdropper which intercepts the transmission between
the typical sensor and the relay in the following Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively.
Lemma 1. The CDF of SINR at the typical relay is derived as (8.6).
Proof. See Appendix E.1.
Lemma 2. The CDF of SINR at the most detrimental eavesdropper which intercepts
the transmission between the typical sensor and the relay is derived as
Fs;e (th) = exp
(
 se
Z 1
0
exp
(
 

ss + apap
2/


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)
2
 t  2tht/2
.
Ps
)
dt: (8.7)
Proof. See Appendix E.2.
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8.3.1.2 Average Secrecy Rate
Based on our preliminary work in [152], the average secrecy rate between the sensor and
the relay is the average of secrecy rate Caps over s;e and ap, which can be written as
Caps =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Fs;e (x)
1 + x
(1  Fap (x))dx: (8.8)
By substituting the CDF of ap in (8.6) and the CDF of s;e in (8.7) into (8.8), we can
obtain the average secrecy rate between the sensor and the relay.
Note that the derived average secrecy rate between the sensor and the relay is not in
a simple form, we present the interference-limited case for the average secrecy rate with
single antenna at the relay in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. When the relays are equipped with single antenna in the interference-
limited scenario, the average secrecy rate between the sensor and the relay is given by
Caps =
ap (1  ap)
ln 2
Z 1
0
exp
 se 1x2/	
(1 + x)
 
1x2/ + ap (1  ap)
dx; (8.9)
where 1 =

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) :
8.3.2 Average Secrecy Rate between the relay and the Sink
Similar to (8.5), for a typical relay and its associated sink, the instantaneous secrecy rate
is dened as
Csks = [Csk   Cap;e]+; (8.10)
where Csk = log2 (1 + sk) and Cap;e = log2 (1 + ap:e).
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8.3.2.1 New Statistics
We rst derive the CDFs of SINRs at the typical sink and the most detrimental eaves-
dropper which intercepts the transmission between the typical relay and the sink in the
following Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, respectively.
Lemma 3. The CDF of SINR at the typical sink is derived as
Fsk (x) = 1  2sk
Z 1
0
r exp
(
 apap  (1 + 2/)
  (1  2/) (th)
2
 r2   thr2
.
Pap   skr2
)
dr   2sk
M 1X
m=1
1
( 1)m
X 1
mQ
l=1
ml!l!ml
Z 1
0
rm+1 exp
(
 apap
  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)
2
 r2   thr2
.
Pap   skr2
)
"
  apap 2

  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)
2
 r2    th
2

Pap
#m1 mY
l=2
"
  apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)
2

l 1Y
j=0
(2/   j) r2 l
#ml
dr: (8.11)
Proof. See Appendix E.3.
Lemma 4. The CDF of SINR at the most detrimental eavesdropper which intercepts
the transmission between the typical relay and the sensor is derived as
Fap;e (x) = exp
(
 ape
Z 1
0
exp

 apap  (1 + 2/)
  (1  2/) th
2
 t  2tht/2
.
Pap

dt
)
: (8.12)
Proof. See Appendix E.4.
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8.3.2.2 Average Secrecy Rate
The average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink is the average of the secrecy
rate Csks over sk and ap;e, which is given by
Csks =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Fsk (x)
1 + x
(1  Fap;e (x))dx: (8.13)
By substituting the CDF of sk in (8.11) and the CDF of ap;e in (8.12) into (8.13), we
can obtain the average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink.
Note that the derived the average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink is also
not in a simple form, we present the interference-limited case for the average secrecy rate
with single antenna at the relay in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. When the relays are equipped with single antenna in the interference-
limited scenario, the average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink is given by
Csks =
sk
ln 2
Z 1
0
exp
 ape 2x2/	
(1 + x)
 
2x2/ + sk
dx; (8.14)
where 2 = apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) : Based on (8.14), for a specic target average
secrecy rate C0 between the relay and the sink, the number of sinks must satisfy
sk > C02
ln 2
"
; (8.15)
where " =
R1
0
expf ape =(2x2=)g
(1+x)x2=
dx.
8.3.3 Overall Average Secrecy Rate
In this subsection, we derive the overall average secrecy rate in three-tier WSNs. The
instantaneous secrecy rate is dened as Cs = min
 
Caps ; Csks

. As such, the overall average
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secrecy rate is calculated as
Cs =
Z 1
0
xfCs (x) dx =
Z 1
0
(1  FCs (x))dx; (8.16)
where fCs (x) and FCs (x) is the probability density function (PDF) and the CDF of Cs,
respectively. The CDF of Cs is calculated as
FCs (x) = Pr

min

Caps ; C
sk
s

< x

= 1  Pr

min

Caps ; C
sk
s

> x

= 1  Pr (Caps > x) Pr

Csks > x

(8.17)
Substituting (8.17) into (8.16), we have
Cs =
Z 1
0
Pr (Caps > x) Pr

Csks > x

dx; (8.18)
where [152]
Pr (Caps > x) = 1 
Z 1
0
fs;e (t)Fap (2
x (1 + t)  1)dt; (8.19)
and
Pr

Csks > x

= 1 
Z 1
0
fap;e (t)Fsk (2
x (1 + t)  1)dt; (8.20)
respectively. Here, fs;e is the derivative of Fs;e given in (8.7), and fap;e is the derivative
of Fap;e given in (8.12).
Unfortunately, the derived overall average secrecy rate between the sensor and the
sink is not in a simple form, we present the interference-limited case for the overall average
secrecy rate with no noise and single antenna at the relay in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. When the relays are equipped with single antenna in the interference-
limited scenario, the overall average secrecy rate between the sensor and the sink is given
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Figure 8.2: The average secrecy rate versus se=s. s = 10
 2, s = 0:01,
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by
Cs =
Z 1
0
2664Z 1
0
2se
1y2/+1
exp

 se
.
1y
2/

ap (1  ap)
1(2x (1 + y)  1)2/ + ap (1  ap)
dy
3775
2664Z 1
0
22ape sk exp
 ape 2y2/	
2y2/+1

2(2x (1 + y)  1)2/ + sk
dy
3775dx; (8.21)
with 1 =

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/), 2 = apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) :
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Figure 8.3: The average secrecy rate versus s. s = 0:05, ap = 0:5, 
s
e =
10 3,  = 3:5, Ps = 15 dBm, Pap = 25 dBm,
8.4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present numerical examples to show the average secrecy rate of three-
tier WSN. We assume that the activity probability of relay ap = 0:1, the transmit
power of sensor Ps = 15 dBm, the power spectral density of noise is  170 dBm/Hz,
and the bandwidth is 1 MHz. For all gures below, we see a perfect match between the
simulations and the exact analytical curves, which validate our analysis.
8.4.1 Average Secrecy Rate between the Sensor and relay
Figure 8.2 plots the average secrecy rate between the sensor and the relay versus se/s.
The analytical results are obtained from (8.8). We rst see that the average secrey rate
decreases with increasing the density of eavesdroppers that intercepts the tranmission
between sensor and relay, due to the detrimental eects of eavesdropping. We also see
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e . ap = 0:1, sk = 10
 2,
 = 3:5, Pap = 15 dBm,
that the average secrecy rate increases with increasing the number of antennas at the
relay, which results from the array again brought by using MRC at the relay.
Figure 8.3 plots the average secrecy rate between the sensor and the relay versus s
for various ap and M . The analytical results are obtained from (8.8). An interesting
observation is that for the same number of antennasM , the average secrecy rate is nearly
invariable for s < 2  10 3, since the interference from other sensors is much smaller
than the interference from the active relays, and slightly increasing the interference from
the sensor imposes negligible eect on the performance. However, when s > 2 10 3,
the interference from other sensors is comparable with the interference from the active
relays, and increasing the interference from the sensor degrades the secrecy performance.
We also observe that increasing ap increases the average secrecy rate. This is because
with more relays, the distance between the typical sensor and the typical relay becomes
shorter, which improves the average secrecy rate. In additiona, we nd that increasing
ap slows down the decreasing trend of average secrecy rate when s increases.
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8.4.2 Average Secrecy Rate between the relay and Sink
Figure 8.4 plots the average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink versus ape /ap
for various ap and M . The analytical results are obtained from (8.13). We rst observe
that the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing ape /ap, which indicates that
more relays need to be deployed as the density of eavesdroppers increases, to combat
eavesdropping. Second, with the same number of antennas at the relay, the average
secrecy rate decreases with increasing ape . The average secrecy rate between the relay
and the sink improves with increasing the number of antennas at the relay M .
Figure 8.5 plots the average secrecy rate between the relay and the sink versus ap
for various sk and M . The analytical results are obtained from (8.13). We observe
that the average secrecy rate alters slightly for ap < 2  10 3, and decreases with
increasing ap for ap > 2  10 3. This can be explained by the fact that for ap <
2  10 3, the interference from the active relays is relatively small compared with the
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noise, and increasing the number of relays scarcely inuence the performance. However,
for ap > 2  10 3, the interference from the relay imposes a dominant impact on the
SINR between the relay and the sink, thus increasing the interference from the relays
degrades the average secrecy rate. Another observation is that the average secrecy rate
improves with increasing the density of sink, because the distance between the typical
relay and the corresponding sink becomes shorter.
8.4.3 Overall Average Secrecy Rate
Figure 8.6 plots the overall average secrecy rate versus ap for various s and sk. The
analytical results are obtained from (8.18). Interestingly, we nd that the overall aver-
age secrecy rate rst increases, and then decreases with increasing ap, which implies
that there exists an optimal ap to achieve the maximum average secrecy rate. This
phenomenon can be well explained by the tradeo between the benets brought by the
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shorter distance from the typical sensor to the typical relay and the detrimental eects
caused by more interference from the active relays due to increasing ap. It is also seen
that the overall average secrecy rate can be improved by deploying more sinks, due to
the shorter distance between the relay and the sink. It is further demonstrated that
deploying more sensors in this network may not greatly degrade the average secrecy rate
due to the low transmit power of sensors. More importantly, it is shown that the optimal
ap is more dependent on the sk.
Figure 8.7 plots the overall average secrecy rate versus ap for various 
s
e, 
ap
e and
M . The analytical results are obtained from (8.18). Similar as Figure 8.6, we see that
the overall average secrecy rate rst increases, and then decreases with increasing ap.
As expected, the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing eavesdroppers. It is
indicated that the optimal ap for achieving the maximum average secrecy rate does not
alter drastically with dierent se and 
ap
e .
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8.5 Conclusions
Physical layer security in three-tier wireless sensor networks was introduced. The impacts
of random locations and spatial densities of sensors, relays, sinks and external eavesdrop-
pers on the secrecy performance were analyzed. New expressions for average secrecy rate
were obtained. The results provide guidelines on the secure transmission in practical
wireless sensor networks. Based on our analysis, the importance of using physical layer
security in the three-tier wireless sensor networks was clearly established.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Works
9.1 Contributions and Insights
This thesis concentrates on the physical layer security in wireless networks. There are
three principal aspects in the thesis: 1) Since physical layer security exploits the prop-
erties of wireless channel such as fading, some practical channel fading have been inves-
tigated; 2) Antenna selection and opportunistic relaying technique have been utilized
for security enhancement; 3) The potentials of physical layer security in the emerging
networks such as cognitive radio networks, relay networks, and wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) have been exploited. The main contributions and insights are as follows.
In Chapter 3, physical layer security in single-input multi-output wiretap channels
under two-wave with diuse power fading was investigated. New closed-form expressions
for the exact and asymptotic average secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability
were derived. It was demonstrated that the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) slope is
one. Particularly, the high SNR slope is not aected by the number of antennas at
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. The impacts of the main channel and the
eavesdropper's channel on the average secrecy capacity were characterized via the high
SNR power oset. It is indicated that the secrecy diversity order is entirely dependent
136
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on legitimate receiver's antennas. It also indicates that the detrimental eect of the
eavesdroppers channel resides in the secrecy array gain. Furthermore, the performance
gap for dierent number of antennas was quantied via their respective secrecy array
gains.
In Chapter 4, a unied framework was presented to examine the secrecy perfor-
mance for antenna selection techniques in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wire-
tap channels. New exact closed-form expressions for the average secrecy rate and the
secrecy outage probability were derived using the new cumulative distribution function
and probability density function of the SNR with transmit antenna selection and gener-
alized selection combining. It is shown that although the high SNR slope is independent
of the network parameters, the high SNR power oset is dependent on the system param-
eters including transceiver antenna conguration and the fading parameters in the main
and the eavesdropper's channels. An interesting conclusion is reached that a capacity
ceiling is created when both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are close to
the transmitter. When the legitimate receiver is close to the transmitter, the full secrecy
diversity order is achieved and is entirely determined by the antenna conguration and
the fading parameters in the main channel. The impact of the eavesdropper is only
reected in the secrecy array gain. The secrecy diversity order collapses to zero when
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are close to the transmitter.
In Chapter 5, fundamental questions were addressed surrounding the joint impact of
two power constraints on the cognitive wiretap channel: 1) the maximum transmit power
at the secondary transmitter, and 2) the peak interference power at PU. To address these
constraints, new closed-form expressions for the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage
probability were derived. Our expressions reveal important design insights surrounding
the impact of the primary network on the secondary network in cognitive wiretap radio
networks.
In Chapter 6, frequency selective fading was considered, in which multiple relays
and multiple destinations coexist with a cluster of eavesdroppers. A two-stage relay
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and destination selection was proposed to minimize the eavesdropping and maximize
the signal power of the link between the relay and the destination. It is conrmed
that the secrecy diversity gain is directly determined by the multipath diversity and the
multiuser diversity between the relays and the destinations. The multiplexing gain is
independent of the system and channel parameters such as the number of multipaths,
relays, eavesdroppers, and destinations. Our high SNR analysis showed that when the
average received power at the eavesdropper is proportional to the counterpart at the
destination, both the secrecy diversity gain and the secrecy capacity slope collapse to
zero, thereby creating a secrecy outage oor and a secrecy capacity ceiling.
In Chapter 7, the secure transmission with optimal power allocation (OPA) and
cooperative jamming was analyzed in the two-hop amplify-and-forward untrusted relay
network. Ergodic secrecy capacity (ESC) was characterized as a performance metric and
compact expressions for asymptotic ESC were derived. Compared to the equal power
allocation, OPA can achieve positive rate even at low SNR. For increasing antennas at
source, there are no signicant increase in ESC, and ESC approaches constant for mod-
erately large antennas, which only depends on the average channel gain of the second
hop and the transmit SNR of the system. For moderately large antennas at the destina-
tion, ESC increases with the number of antennas at the destination, when the number
of antennas is massive, ESC only depends on the average channel gain of the rst hop
and the transmit SNR of the system.
In Chapter 8, a new analytical framework was presented to examine the implementa-
tion of physical layer security in three-tier WSNs. The locations and spatial densities of
sensors, relays, sinks, and eavesdroppers are modeled using stochastic geometry. Each
relay used the low-complexity maximal-ratio combining (MRC) to receive the sensor's
data signals and maximal-ratio transmission (MRT) beamformer to transmit the signals.
The secure transmissions between the active sensors and relays, and between the active
access points and sinks were investigated. Using MRC/MRT at relays can enhance the
secure transmission. Based on the proposed analysis and simulations, several important
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observations are reached: 1) the average secrecy rate decreases as the number of sensors
grows large, due to more interference from sensors, 2) the average secrecy rate increases
with increasing the number of sinks, because of the shorter distances between the relays
and their associated sinks, and 3) the overall average secrecy rate increases with increas-
ing the number of relays, although it decreases the average secrecy rate between the relay
and its associated sink. However, beyond a critical value, the overall average secrecy rate
decreases with increasing the number of relays.
9.2 Future Works
In this subsection, two extensions of the current work are proposed. Furthermore, phys-
ical layer security in 5G networks is investigated.
9.2.1 Extensions of Current Work
9.2.1.1 Imperfect CSI
Current work in this thesis may also need to consider the impact of imperfect channel
state information (CSI), although imperfect CSI wiretap channel is a challenging prob-
lem. The key performance parameters such as high SNR slope and power oset under
imperfect CSI are not known and have not been examined in the existing literature.
In Chapter 5, the interference power at the primary receiver inicted by the sec-
ondary transmitter must not exceed the maximal peak, however, this constraint may
not be guaranteed under imperfect CSI [117]. New secure transmission designs may be
demanded. The secrecy outage probability and average achievable secrecy rate in such
scenario also need to be analyzed.
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9.2.1.2 Multi-hop Secure Transmission with Trusted/Untrusted Relay
In this thesis, secure transmission was investigated in two-hop networks with external
eavesdroppers (Chapters 6 and 8) and two-hop untrusted relay networks (Chapter 7).
Such line of work may be extended to the multi-hop case, which is an interesting and
practical research area. In [157], an multi-hop line work was considered and all the
intermediate relays were assumed to be untrusted, it was shown that using the proposed
transmission schedule, an end-to-end secrecy rate can be achieved in an information-
theoretical way, which is independent of the number of hops. However, more research
eorts are needed to fully understand this eld before the application in practice.
9.2.2 Physical Layer Security in 5G Systems
Massive MIMO and millimeter wave (mmWave) are two promising techniques in 5G
networks. The investigation of physical layer security in massive MIMO and mmWave
systems is an appealing and highly rewarding research eld.
9.2.2.1 Massive MIMO
Massive MIMO systems are emerging as a new research eld and have attracted sub-
stantial interests from both scientists and industrialists. The benets of the massive
MIMO technique are realized by using very large antenna arrays (typically tens or even
hundreds) at the transmitter and/or the receiver. Compared with the current coun-
terpart, massive MIMO systems can bring high power and spectrum eciency with
low-complexity transmission designs. Random impairments such as small-scale fading
and noise are averaged out when a large number of antennas are deployed at the base
station (BS) [158]. Moreover, the interference, channel estimation errors, and hardware
impairments [159] vanish when the number of antennas grows large, leaving only pilot
contamination as the performance limit [160]. Therefore, massive MIMO opens up a
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new and promising research avenue, extending the current research eorts in conven-
tional MIMO systems to a new area. Specically, we consider the following aspects:
 Low Power Consumption: In massive MIMO systems, the secrecy performance
can be remarkably enhanced by adopting a reduced power consumption.
 Time Division Duplex Operation: Massive MIMO systems are recommended
to operate in a time division duplex (TDD) mode [161]. As such, it becomes dicult
for eavesdroppers to know the CSI between themselves and the BS, as well as the
CSI from other users to the BS. Therefore, how to design secure transmission under
the assumption of imperfect (or no) CSI at eavesdroppers is of practical importance
in massive MIMO systems.
 Secure Multiuser Communications: In massive MIMO systems, each base
station simultaneously communicates with multiple users. Each downlink message
must be kept condential from all the users other than the intended one, i.e., each
receiver is seen as an eavesdropper for all messages other than its own. Therefore, it
is pivotal to provide design guidelines and performance metrics of linear precoders
in massive MIMO systems.
9.2.2.2 Millimeter Wave
In the 5G network, mmWave communication systems, operating in the frequency range
of 30-300 GHz, have been recognized as a promising solution to remove the restriction
and meet a thousand-fold capacity increase [63]. MmWave with physical layer security
has at least the following merits:
 Large Bandwidth: MmWave communication systems provide GHz bandwidths.
Therefore, the secrecy outage probability in the passive eavesdropping scenario
is remarkably reduced if the transmitter sets a lower transmit secrecy rate in
mmWave communications. Also, high secrecy throughput can be obtained with
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large mmWave bandwidths.
 Short-range Transmission: Compared to the current microwave communication
systems in the lower frequencies, mmWave signals in the higher frequencies experi-
ence an increase in free-space path loss by several orders of magnitude. Therefore,
only geographically neighbouring eavesdroppers are able to overhear the signals,
whereas geographically remote users cannot capture the data transmission.
 Large Antenna Arrays: For a xed array aperture, the shorter wavelengths at
the mmWave frequencies enable the mmWave BSs to pack more antennas. There-
fore, mmWave systems with large antenna arrays oer a wealth of opportunities
at the physical layer security to secure mmWave communication.
Based on the aforementioned factors, the aim of physical layer security design in
mmWave communication systems is to fully exploit the potentials of these factors. In
this design, several challenging tasks need to be solved.
First, the propagation characteristics at higher frequencies need to be precisely mod-
eled. Indeed, an accurate and comprehensive quantication of the impact of path loss,
blocking, penetration, and rain absorption on mmWave transmission enables network
security designers to theoretically capture the properties of mmWave channels and
address these properties in their design.
Second, new secure transmission schemes need to be developed. It has been shown
that beamforming is a key enabler of mmWave mobile broadband service [162]. Since
digital beamforming with a large number of radio frequency (RF) chains incurs a very
high implementation cost and power consumption, secure mmWave transmission needs
to be designed based on analog beamforming and RF beamforming with a small number
of RF chains.
Third, some traditional techniques need to be re-designed. For example, articial
noise is proposed to enhance the security in traditional systems. The core idea behind
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it is to transmit articial noise in the null space of the receiver's channel, thus imposing
no eect on the intended channel, whereas degrading the wiretap channels [72]. For
mmWave systems equipped with large antenna arrays, the computation of the null space
becomes infeasible, due to the high dimensional MIMO channel matrix. The use of ran-
dom and independent articial noise may be a promising solution since the independent
articial noise can be averaged out with large antenna arrays. As an external helper, the
cooperative jammer can help to enhance the security by transmitting the jamming signal,
in order to confound the eavesdroppers. In traditional systems, the information signal at
the transmitter and jamming signal at the jammer are jointly designed, to mitigate the
adverse eect of jamming on the legitimate receiver. Thanks to the mmWave networks'
inherently noise-limited feature and massive MIMO's interference mitigation capability,
the traditional design requirements for cooperative jamming may not be needed.
Appendix A
Proofs of in Chapter 4
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We rst present the PDF and the CDF of the SNR of a single branch in the main channel
with Nakagami-m fading as [163]
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respectively. The marginal moment generating function (MGF) of (A.1.1) is given by [91]
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As shown in [91, 164], the MGF expression for the SNR  after GSC is expressed as
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Here, the MGF is dened as  (s) = E [e s]. In order to evaluate the integral in
(A.1.4), we will rewrite ( (s; x))LB 1 and (F (x))NB LB .
Based on (A.1.3), using the multinomial theorem [165], we rewrite ( (s; x))LB 1 as
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Based on (A.1.2), we proceed to employ the multinomial theorem to express (F (x))NB LB
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Substituting (A.1.1), (A.1.5), and (A.1.6) into (A.1.4), and applying [140, eq. (3.351.3)],
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Let F (x) denote the CDF of , the Laplace transform of F (x) is given by L [F (x)] =
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Using a partial fraction expansion [140, eq. (2.102)], we can rewrite (A.1.8) in an
equivalent form. Then, taking the inverse Laplace transform of L [F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where n2 = n mB (LB   1) + bk . In (A.1.9), we also have
n =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 n = 0
n  1 1  n  mB (LB   1)  bk
n  sgn  cFk   mB (LB   1)  bk   1
mB (LB   1)  bk < n  mBLB + bFk
and
n =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 n = 0
mB
B
1  n  mB (LB   1)  bk
cFk
LB
+ mBB

mB (LB   1)  bk < n  mBLB + bFk
The CDF of B with TAS and GSC is given by FB = (F (x))
NA . Based on (A.1.9),
and employing the multinomial theorem, we derive the CDF of B as (4.4). Taking the
derivative of the CDF in (4.4), we obtain the PDF of B as (4.5).
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We start with the asymptotic CDF for the SNR of a single branch of the main channel.
In the high SNR regime with B ! 1, applying the Taylor series expansion truncated
to the kth order given by ex =
kP
j=0
xj
j! + o
 
xk

in (A.1.2), we obtain
F (x) = 1  e x
mB
B
0B@exmBB  

xmBB
mB
mB!
  o
 
x
mB
B
mB!1CA
=

xmBB
mB
mB!
+ o (xmB ) : (A.2.1)
Substituting (A.1.1), (A.1.5), and (A.2.1) into (A.1.4) yields
 (s) =
LB
(mB   1)!(mB!)NB LB

NB
LB

mB
B
mBNB
X
SB
ak
 
bk +mB (NB   LB) +mB   1

!
(LB)
bk+mB(NB LB)+mB

s+ mBB
mBNB : (A.2.2)
It is shown in Appendix A that L [F (x)] =  (s) =s. Taking the inverse Laplace
transform of L [F (x)], F is derived as
F (x) =
LB
(mB   1)!(mB!)NB LB

NB
LB

mB
B
mBNB
X
SB
ak
 
bk +mB (NB   LB) +mB   1

!
(LB)
bk+mB(NB LB)+mB
0BB@
 
mB
B
! mBNB
 
mBNBX
n=1

mB
B
 (mBNB n+1)
(n  1)! x
n 1e 
mB
B
x
1CCA: (A.2.3)
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Still employing the Taylor series expansion truncated to the kth order given by ex =
kP
j=0
xj
j! + o
 
xk

in (A.2.3), we rewrite (A.2.3) as
F (x) =
LB
 
NB
LB

mB
B
mBNB
xmBNB
(mB   1)!(mB!)NB LB (mBNB)!
X
SB
ak
 
bk +mB (NB   LB) +mB   1

!
(LB)
bk+mB(NB LB)+mB
:
(A.2.4)
Based on (A.2.4), the asymptotic expression for the CDF of B is FB (x) = (F (x))
NA
and the nal expression is shown in (4.6).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Substituting (4.12) into (4.10), we rewrite the average secrecy rate as
Cs =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
FE (x2)
1 + x2
dx2

fB (x1) dx1: (A.3.1)
Substituting (4.15) into (A.3.1), we transform (A.3.1) as
Cs =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
ln (1 + x1) fB (x1)dx1| {z }
!2
+
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
E (x2)
1+x2
fB (x1)dx2dx1| {z }
!3
: (A.3.2)
In the high SNR regime with B ! 1, ln (1 + x1)  ln (x1), thereby the asymptotic
expression for !2 can be written as 1 in (4.17). Changing the order of integration in
!3, we rewrite
!3 =
1
ln 2
Z 1
0
E (x2)
1+x2
(1  FB (x2))dx2: (A.3.3)
According to (4.6), when B ! 1, FB (x2)  0. Hence, the asymptotic expression for
!3 can be expressed as 2 in (4.18). Based on (4.17), (4.18), and (A.3.2), we derive the
asymptotic expression for the average secrecy rate as (4.16).
Appendix B
Proofs in Chapter 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We rst provide the CDF and PDF of Y = max
n=1;:::;N
Yn, where Yn is i.i.d. exponential RV
with parameter 
Y , which can be written as
FY (y) =
NX
n=0

N
n

( 1)ne 
ny

Y (B.1)
and
fY (y) =
N 1X
n=0

N   1
n

N

Y
( 1)ne 
(n+1)y

Y : (B.2)
In addition, fX (x) =
1

0
e
  x

0 .
Based on (5.3), we note that when X  p0 , M = 0YM ; E = 0YE , and when
X >
p
0
, M =
p
X YM ; E =
p
X YE . Hence, the secrecy outage probability in (5.12) can be
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calculated as
Pout =
Z p
0
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dEdx| {z }
J1
+
Z 1
p
0
Z 1
0
FMjfX=xg ((E)) fEjfX=xg (E) fX (x) dEdx| {z }
J2
: (B.3)
Based on (B.1), for X  p0 , we have
FMjfX=xg ((E)) =
nBX
i=0

nB
i

( 1)ie 
i(E)
0
1 ;
fEjfX=xg (E) =
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)je 
(j+1)E
0
2 : (B.4)
By substituting (B.4) into J1 of (B.3), J1 can be derived as
J1 =
Z p
0
0
fX (x) dx
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)i+j
Z 1
0
e
  i(E)
0
1
  (j+1)E
0
2 dE
=

1  e 
p
0
0
 nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
0
2
( 1)i+je 
i(2Rs 1)
0
1

i2Rs
0
1
+
j + 1
0
2
 1
:
(B.5)
For X >
p
0
, we have
FMjfX=xg ((E)) =
nBX
i=0

nB
i

( 1)ie 
i(E)
p
1
x
;
fEjfX=xg (E) =
nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)jxe 
(j+1)E
p
2
x
: (B.6)
Appendix B. Proofs in Chapter 5 152
By substituting (B.6) into J2 of (B.3), J2 can be derived as
J2 =
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0
Z 1
p
0
e
  x

0
Z 1
0
xe
  i(E)
p
1
x  (j+1)E
p
2
x
dEdx
=
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0
Z 1
p
0
xe
  x

0 e
  i(2
Rs 1)
p
1
x
Z 1
0
e
  i2
RsxE
p
1
  (j+1)E
p
2
x
dEdx
=
nBX
i=0

nB
i
 nE 1X
j=0

nE   1
j

nE
p
2
( 1)i+j 1

0

i2Rs
p
1
+
j + 1
p
2
 1
e
  p
0
0
  i(2
Rs 1)
0
1
1

0
+ i(2
Rs 1)
p
1
:
(B.7)
Substituting (B.5) and (B.7) into (B.3), we get the desired result (5.13).
Appendix C
Proofs in Chapter 6
C.1 A detailed derivation of Lemma 1
According to the order statistics, the PDF of min;max2 is given by
f
min;max2
(x) = K(1  F
k;max2
(x))K 1f
k;max2
(x): (C.1.1)
Binomial and multinomial formulas provide the following expression for f
k;max2
(x):
f
k;max2
(x) =
N
(~2)N2(N2   1)!
N 1X
j=0

N   1
j

( 1)je 
x(j+1)
~2

jX
u1;:::;uN2
 
j!
u1! : : : uN2 !
!
xN2+
PN2 1
t=0 tut+1 1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)ut+1
: (C.1.2)
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Pout =
Z 1
0
h
1  e (JR 1+JR)=~1
N1 1X
l=0
1
l!
(JR   1 + JR)
~1
liQ
f
min;max2
()d
=
QX
q=0

Q
q

( 1)q
Z 1
0
e q(JR 1+JR)=~1
hN1 1X
l=0
1
l!
(JR   1 + JR)
~1
liq
| {z }
J1
f
min;max2
()d:
(C.2.1)
Again binomial and multinomial formulas lead us to get the following expression for
(1  F
k;max2
(x))K 1:
(1  F
k;max2
(x))K 1 =
"
1 
 
1  e x=~2
N2 1X
l=0
1
l!
 
x
~2
!l!N#K 1
=
K 1X
k=0

K   1
k

( 1)k
 
1  e x=~2
N2 1X
l=0
1
l!
 
x
~2
!l!kN
=
K 1X
k=0

K   1
k

( 1)k
NkX
m=0

Nk
m

( 1)me mx=~2

mX
v1;:::;vN2
 
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
!
x
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
: (C.1.3)
Multiplying (C.1.2) and (C.1.3) and after some manipulations, yields (6.8).
C.2 A detailed derivation of Theorem 1
Now substituting f
min;max2
(), which is derived in (6.8) and F
k
;q
1
(), which is derived in
(6.5) into (6.12), we have (C.2.1). Using multinomial and binomial formulas, J1 becomes
J1 =
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
~L1X
p=0
~L1
p

(JR   1)~L1 p(JR)pp: (C.2.2)
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Substituting (C.2.2) into (C.2.1), yields
Pout =
QX
q=0

Q
q

( 1)qe 
q(JR 1)
~1
qX
w1;:::;wN1
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !P~L1
p=0
 ~L1
p

(JR   1)~L1 p(JR)pQN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
Z 1
0
e qJR=~1pf
min;max2
()d: (C.2.3)
Again using (6.8) into (C.2.3), we have (6.13).
C.3 A detailed derivation of Theorem 2
Applying the Taylor series expansion truncated to the N1th order given by e
x =
N1P
l=0
xl
l! +
O(xN1), we derive the rst order expansion of F
k
;q
1
(x), which is specied in (6.5), at
high ~1 as
F
k
;q
1
(x) =
"
1  e x=~1
 
ex=~1   1
N1!
 
x
~1
!N1
 O(( x
~1
)N1

)
#Q
=
1
(N1!)Q

x
~1
QN1
+O((~1)
 QN1): (C.3.1)
In addition, the PDF expression f
min;max2
(x) in (8) needs to be written as
f
min;max2
(x) = C^
dX x ~N2 1
(~2)
~N2
e
  ^x
~2U(x): (C.3.2)
Substituting (C.3.1) and (C.3.2) into (6.12), the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
is calculated as (C.3.3) which proves (6.15).
Appendix C. Proofs in Chapter 6 156
P1out =
C^
(N1!)Q
dXZ 1
0
JR + JR   1
~1
QN1  ~N2 1
(~2)
~N2
e
  ^
~2 d +O((~1)
 QN1)
=
C^
(N1!)Q
dXQN1X
l=0

N1
l
 1
~1
QN1
(JR   1)QN1 l(JR)l
Z 1
0
l

~N2 1 
~1
 ~N2 e  ^~2 d +O((~1) QN1)
=
C
(N1!)Q
dXQN1X
l=0

QN1
l
 1
~1
QN1
(JR   1)QN1 l(JR)l(~2)l (l +
~N2   1)!
(^)l+ ~N2
+O
 
(~1)
 QN1
= (Ga~1)
 QN1 +O((~1) QN1): (C.3.3)
C.4 A detailed derivation of Corollary 2
The CDF of min;max2 is given by
F
min;max2
(x) = 1  (1  F
k;max2
(x))K
= 1 
KX
k=0
NkX
m=0

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)k+me mx=~2
mX
v1;:::;vN2
 
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
!
x
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
: (C.4.1)
In addition, the PDF of k
;q
1 is given by
f
k
;q
1
(x) =
Q
(~1)N1(N1   1)!
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
 
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
!
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
xN1+
PN1 1
t=0 twt+1 1e 
x(q+1)
~1 U(x): (C.4.2)
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The probability of non-zero achievable secrecy rate is given by
Pr(Cs > 0) =
Z 1
0
F
min;max2
(x)f
k
;q
1
(x)dx
= 1  Q
(~1)N1(N1   1)!
KX
k=0
NkX
m=0
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)q+k+m
mX
v1;:::;vN2
 
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
!
qX
w1;:::;wN1
 
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
!
1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!(~1)
t)wt+1
Z 1
0
e
 x( m
~2
+ q+1
~1
)
x
~N1 1dx (C.4.3)
which becomes (6.18).
C.5 A detailed derivation of Corollary 3
Based on (C.4.1), we rst rewrite the CDF of min;max2 as
F
min;max2
(x) = 1 + ~F
min;max2
(x); (C.5.1)
where
~F
min;max2
(x) =
KX
k=1
NkX
m=1

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)k+m+1e mx=~2
mX
v1;:::;vN2
 
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
!
x
PN2 1
t=0 tvt+1QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)vt+1
:
Then, the ergodic secrecy rate is derived as (C.5.2). As ~1 ! 1, 1 asymptotically
becomes
11 = log (~1) +
Z 1
0
log

x1
~1

f
k
;q
1
(x1) dx1: (C.5.3)
Substituting the PDF of k
;q
1 given in (C.4.2) into (C.5.3), and employing [140, eq.
4.352.1] given by
R1
0 x
 1e x log (x) dx = 1   ()

 ()  log ()

, we compute (C.5.3)
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Cs =
1
2 log(2)
Z 1
0
"Z x1
0
F
min;max2
(x2)
1 + x2
dx2
#
f
k
;q
1
(x1) dx1
=
1
2 log(2)
h Z 1
0
log(1 + x1)fk
;q
1
(x1)dx1| {z }
1
+
Z 1
0
Z x1
0
~F
min;max2
(x2)
1 + x2
f
k
;q
1
(x1)dx2dx1| {z }
2
i
:
(C.5.2)
as
11 = log(~1) +
Q
(N1   1)!
Q 1X
q=0

Q  1
q

( 1)q
qX
w1;:::;wN1
(
q!
w1! : : : wN1 !
)
1QN1 1
t=0 (t!)
wt+1
 (N1 + ~L1)
(q + 1)N1+~L1

 (N1 + ~L1)  log(q + 1)

: (C.5.4)
Changing the order of integration in 2, we have
2 =
Z 1
0
~F
min;max2
(x2)
1 + x2
(1  F
k
;q
1
(x2))dx2: (C.5.5)
According to the rst order expansion of the CDF of k
;q
1 shown in (C.3.1), as ~1 !1,
F
k
;q
1
(x2)  0. Hence, the asymptotic expression for 2 is given by
12 =
Z 1
0
~F
min;max2
(x2)
1 + x2
dx2
=
KX
k=1
NkX
m=1

K
k

Nk
m

( 1)k+m+1
mX
v1;:::;vN2
(
m!
v1! : : : vN2 !
)
 (
N2 1P
t=0
tvt+1 + 1)QN2 1
t=0 (t!(~2)
t)
vt+1	(
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;
N2 1X
t=0
tvt+1 + 1;m=~2): (C.5.6)
Substituting (C.5.6) and (C.5.4) into (C.5.2), we derive the asymptotic expression for
the ergodic secrecy capacity as (6.26).
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C.6 A detailed derivation of Corollary 4
In the case of ~1 ! 1 and ~2 ! 1 with ~1~2 = , the asymptotic ergodic secrecy rate
can be easily obtained based on the proof of Corollary 3 in Appendix E. We only need
to further provide an asymptotic expression for 12 with ~2 ! 1. Observing 11 in
(C.5.3), an asymptotic expression for 12 can be derived as
121 =   log (~2) 
Z 1
0
log

x2
~2

f
min;max2
(x2) dx2: (C.6.1)
Substituting the PDF of min;max2 in (6.8) into (C.6.1), we obtain
121 =   log(~2)  C^dX ( ~N2)
(^) ~N2
[ ( ~N2)  log(^)]: (C.6.2)
Substituting the new asymptotic expression for 12 in (C.6.2) and (C.5.4) into (C.5.2),
we get (6.29).
Appendix D
Proof in Chapter 7
D.1 Derivation of (7.12)
We see that OPA can achieve perfect secrecy. Hence, based on (7.4) and (7.3), ESC in
(7.10) can be rewritten as
Cs =
1
2 ln 2
(`1   `2) ; (D.1)
where
`1 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln

1 +
x2
+ 2  

fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2 (D.2)
and
`2 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln

1 +

(1  )

fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2: (D.3)
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In addition, the PDF of a;r and the PDF of r;b is written as
fa;r (x) =
xNa 1e 
x
a;r
(Na   1)!(a;r)Na
; (D.4)
fr;b (x)=
1
r;b
e
  x
r;b : (D.5)
In the high SNR regime with 0 !1, `1 is evaluated as
`1 =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln a;rfa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2| {z }
1
+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln


+ 2  

fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2| {z }
2
+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
x2 ln
x2
a;r
fa;r (x2) fr;b (x2) ddx2| {z }
3
: (D.6)
It is easily seen that 1 = ln a;r. Substituting (D.4) and (D.5) into (D.6), and after
some manipulations, we obtain 2 as
2 = Na
a;r
r;b
Z 1
0
Na 1 ln


+2 


+
a;r
r;b
(Na+1) d: (D.7)
Using [140, Eq. (4.352.1)], 3 is derived as 3 =  (Na).
Substituting 1, 2 and 3 into (D.6), we rst obtain `1. Then, `2 can be evaluated
as
`2 = Na
a;r
r;b
Z 1
0
Na 1 ln

1 + 

(1 )


+
a;r
r;b
(Na+1) d: (D.8)
Plugging `1, `2, and the OPA factor given by (7.8) into (D.1), and after some manipu-
lations, we arrive at the desired result shown in (7.12).
Appendix E
Proofs in Chapter 8
E.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From (8.1), the CDF of ap is given by
Fap (th) =
Z 1
0
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
fjXs0;ap0 j (r) dr
=
Z 1
0
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
2ap
(1  ap) r exp
  ap (1  ap) r2 dr; (E.1.1)
where fjXs0;ap0 j (r) is the PDF of the nearest distance between the relay and the typical
sensor. The CDF of the relay SINR at distance r from its corresponding sensor is given
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as
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
=Es;a
(
Eap;a
(
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2:
 thr
 
Inap + 
2

Ps
s;a;ap;a#))
= 1 
M 1X
m=0
1
m!
Es;a
(
Eap;a
(Z 1
0

thr

 
 + 2

Ps
m
exp
 thr   + 2Ps dPr (Inap  )
))
(E.1.2)
We then substitute
     + 2Ps thme (+2/Ps)fsgth r = dm

e
 thx(+2/Ps)

dxm

x=r
into (E.1.2), we rewrite the CDF of the relay SINR at distance r from its corresponding
sensor as
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
=1 Es;a
(
Eap;a
(
Z 1
0
exp
 thr   + 2Ps dPr (Inap  )
))
 
M 1X
m=1
(r)m
m!( 1)mEs;a
8>><>>:Eap;a
8>><>>:
Z 1
0
dm

e thx(+
2/Ps)

dxm

x=r
dPr (Inap  )
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
= 1  exp   thr2PsLInap (thr)
 
M 1X
m=1
(r)m
m!( 1)m
dm
 
exp
  thx2PsLInap (thx)
dxm

x=r
: (E.1.3)
Remind that Is;ap =
P
i2s;anfs0g
 hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0khi;ap0
2jXi;ap0 j , using Slivnyak's theorem,
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the Laplace transform of Is;ap is
LIs;ap (s) = Es
24exp
8<: s X
i2s;anfs0g
 hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0khi;ap0

2
jXi;ap0 j 
9=;
35
(a)
= exp
(
 2ss
Z 1
0
 
1  L hs0;ap0y
khs0;ap0khi;ap0
 
sy 
!
ydy
)
(b)
= exp

 2ss
Z 1
0

1  1
1 + sy 

ydy

= exp
n
 ss  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
; (E.1.4)
In (E.1.4), (a) follows from the generating functional of HPPP in [89], (b) follows from
the fact that
 hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0khi;ap0
2  exp (1).
Since Iap;ap = 
P
j2ap;anfap0g
 hs0;ap0ykhs0;ap0kHj;ap0 hj;skj yhj;skj

2
jXj;ap0 j 
= 
P
j2apnfap0gH
ap;ap
j jXj;ap0 j , the Laplace transform of Iap;ap is
LIap;ap (s)
(c)
= exp

 
Z 1
0
h
1 Eh

exp

 sHap;apj y 
i
apap2ydy

= exp

 apap 2Eh

Hap;apj
 2


 

1  2


s
2


(d)
= exp
n
 apap 2  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
; (E.1.5)
where (c) follows from the generating functional of HPPP in [89], (d) follows from
Hap;apj  exp (1).
With the Laplace transform of Is;ap and Iap;ap, we derive the Laplace transform of
Inap as
LInap (s) = LIs;ap (s)LIap;ap (s)
= exp
n
 

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
: (E.1.6)
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Substituting (E.1.6) into (E.1.3), we obtain
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
= 1  exp
n
 

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)2/r2 thr2

Ps
o
 
M 1X
m=1
(r)m
m!( 1)m
dm (V (x))
dxm

x=r
; (E.1.7)
where V (x) = exp
n
 

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (thx)2/   thx2

Ps
o
.
We then apply the Faa di Bruno's formula to solve the derivative of mth order as
follows:
Pr
"
khs0;ap0k2r 
Inap + 2

Ps
 th
#
= 1  exp
(
 

ss + apap
2


  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/)(th)2/r2   thr2

Ps
)
 
M 1X
m=1
(r)m
( 1)m
X 1
mQ
l=1
ml!l!ml
exp
(
 

ss + apap
2/

  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/)(th)2/r2   thr2

Ps
)
"
 2/

ss + apap
2/

  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/)
(th)
2
 r(2 ) th2

Ps
#m1 mY
l=2
"
 

ss + apap
2/

  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)
2

l 1Y
j=0
(2/  j) r2 l
#ml
(E.1.8)
Substituting (E.1.8) into (E.1.1),we derive the CDF of ap in (8.6).
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E.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From (8.2), the CDF of s;e is given by
Fs;e (th) = Pr
8>><>>: maxek2s;e
8>><>>:
jhs0;ek j2jXs0;ek j 
Ins;e + 2

Ps
9>>=>>;  th
9>>=>>;
= Es;a
8>><>>:Eap;a
8>><>>:Es;e
8>><>>:
Y
ek2s;e
Pr
8>><>>:
jhs0;ek j2jXs0;ek j 
Ins;e + 2

Ps
 th
s;a;ap;a;s;e
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
= Es;a
8>><>>:Eap;a
8>><>>:Es;e
8>><>>:
Y
ek2s;e
(1 
Z 1
0
e (+
2/Ps)thjXs0;ek jdPr (Ins;e  )
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
9>>=>>;
= Es;e
8>><>>:
Y
ek2s;e

1  e 2thjXs0;ek j

/PsLIns;e (thjXs0;ek j)
9>>=>>;
(a)
= exp

 se
Z
R2
e 
2thjXs0;ek j/PsLIns;e (thjXs0;ek j) d jXs0;ek j

(b)
= exp

 2se
Z 1
0
e 
2thr
/PsLIns;e (thr) rdr

; (E.2.1)
where (a) follows from the generating functional of HPPP in [89], (b) is obtained by
converting cartesian coordinates to polar coordinates.
Using the generating functional of HPPP in [89], jhi;ek j2  exp (1), and Hap;ej =hj;ek hj;skj yhj;skj

2
 exp (1), we derive the Laplace transform of Is;e and Iap;e as
LIs;e (s) = exp

 
Z 1
0
h
1 Eh

exp

 sjhi;ek j2y 
i
ss2ydy

= exp
n
 ss  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
; (E.2.2)
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and
LIap;e (s) = exp

 
Z 1
0
h
1 Eh

exp

 sHap;ej y 
i
apap2ydy

= exp

 apap 2Eh

Hap;ej
 2


  (1  2/) s2/

= exp
n
 apap 2  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
; (E.2.3)
respectively.
With the Laplace transform of Is;e and Iap;e, we derive the Laplace transform of Ins;e
as
LIns;e (s) = exp
n
 ss  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/   ap
ap
2/  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
: (E.2.4)
Substituting (E.2.4) into (E.4.1), we derive the CDF of s;e in (8.7).
E.3 Proof of Lemma 3
From (8.3), the CDF of sk is given by
Fsk (th) =
Z 1
0
Pr
2664 kgap0;sk0k2r Inap;sk + 2Pap  th
3775fjXap0;sk0 j (r) dr
=
Z 1
0
Pr
2664 kgap0;sk0k2r Inap;sk + 2Pap  th
37752skr exp   skr2 dr: (E.3.1)
where fjXap0;sk0 j (r) is the PDF of the nearest distance between the sink and the typical
relay.
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The CDF of the sink SINR at distance r from its corresponding relay is derived as
Pr
2664 kgap0;sk0k2r Inap;sk + 2Pap  th
3775 = Eap;a
(
Pr
"
kgap0;sk0k2 thr
 
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2

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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1
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(Z 1
0
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 
 + 2

Pap
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 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 
 + 2

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)
)
: (E.3.2)
Note that
     + 2Pap thme (+2/Pap)fsgth r = dm

e
 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+2/Pap)

dxm

x=r
, we
rewrite (E.3.2) as
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0
exp
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 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 
 + 2

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dPr (Inap;sk  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m!( 1)mEap;a
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
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thx(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dxm
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dPr (Inap;sk  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9>>=>>;
= 1  exp

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thr2
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 
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exp
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thx2PapLInap;sk (thx)
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: (E.3.3)
Since Inap;sk =
P
j2ap;anfap0g
gj;sk0 hj;skj yhj;skj

2
jXj;sk0 j  , using the generating functional
of HPPP and
gj;sk0 hj;skj yhj;skj

2
 exp (1) , we derive the Laplace transform of Inap;sk as
LInap;sk (s) = exp
n
 apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
: (E.3.4)
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Substituting (E.3.4) into (E.3.3), we obtain
Pr
2664 kgap0;sk0k2r Inap;sk + 2Pap  th
3775 = 1  exp
(
 apap  (1 + 2/)
  (1  2/) (th)2/r2   thr2
.
Pap
)
 
M 1X
m=1
 
r
m
m!( 1)m
dm (U (x))
dxm

x=r
; (E.3.5)
where U (x) = exp
(
 apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (thx)2/   thx2

Pap
)
.
We then apply the Faa di Bruno's formula to solve the derivative of mth order as
follows:
dm [exp (U (x))]
dxm

x=r
=
X 1
mQ
l=1
ml!l!ml
exp
(
 apap
  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)2/r2   thr2
.
Pap
)"
  ap
ap
2

  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)2/x2/ 1   th2

Pap
#m1
mY
l=2
"
  apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) (th)2/
l 1Y
j=0
(2/   j)x2/ l
#ml
: (E.3.6)
Based on (E.3.6), (E.3.5), and (E.3.1), we derive the CDF of sk in (8.11).
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E.4 Proof of Lemma 4
From (8.4), the CDF of ap;e is given by
Fs;e (th) = Eap;a
8>><>>:Eap;e
8>><>>:
Y
ek2ap;e
Pr
(
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Y
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o
(a)
= exp
(
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e
 2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!
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= exp
(
 2ape
Z 1
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e 
2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/PapLInap;e

thr


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)
; (E.4.1)
where (a) follows from the generating functional of HPPP in [89], (b) is obtained by
converting cartesian coordinates to polar coordinates.
Using the generating functional of HPPP in [89], we derive the Laplace transform of
Iap;e as
LIap;e (s) = exp
n
 apap  (1 + 2/)   (1  2/) s2/
o
: (E.4.2)
Plugging (E.4.2) into (E.4.1), we derive the CDF of s;e in (8.12).
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